

REASONS AS CAUSES: A CRITICAL RE-EXAMINATION OF DONALD DAVIDSON'S STANDARD THEORY OF ACTION THROUGH CONTEXTUAL-NORMATIVE INTEGRATION

Ngozi Alexandra Umeh
ngozialexandraumeh@gmail.com
Department of Philosophy
University of Nigeria, Nsukka

ABSTRACT

Donald Davidson's Standard Theory of Action stands as one of the leading perspectives in the philosophy of action. It claims that human actions are intentional when explained by the reasons that act as causes of the action. Although his framework successfully bridges empirical causation with normative rationalization, it continues to face perpetual objections which include the problem of insufficient normativity and deviant causal chains. This research supports Davidson's causal thesis using critical conceptual analysis and cross-cultural comparative methodology called "Contextual-Normative Integration." I argue that reasons act as causes within culturally-embedded normative systems, instead of existing abstractly from social context. I argue that the problem of deviant causation can be addressed by stipulating that causal relations function through culturally-validated rational processes inspired by insights from African philosophy of communitarianism to enhance Davidson's individualistic framework. Comparing African and Western approaches to agency using cross-cultural analysis, I argue that the standard theory of Davidson holds explanatory capacity when embedded in a community-based normative framework. The paper demonstrates that while Davidson's basic understanding of reasons as causes continues to be true, there is need to align with contextual norms to effectively tackle contemporary challenges in cross-cultural ethics, legal accountability and moral obligation. This contextual-normative approach aims to preserve the scientific credibility of causal explanation while upholding the irreducibly normative and social dimensions of human action and agency.

Keywords: Donald Davidson, Standard Theory of Action, Deviant Causation, Moral Responsibility, African Communitarian Philosophy, Contextual Normativity, Cross-Cultural Agency

INTRODUCTION

Action theory aims to address a seemingly simple question: what makes an action intentional? Davidson's work from his influential essay "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963/1980), redefined this study by advocating that reasons explain actions because reasons are causes of actions. This idea formed the basis of what is known today as the Standard Theory of Action, a position that remains an influential discussion in philosophy of social sciences, mind and ethics (Schlosser, 2019). Davidson's philosophical account was game-changing because it closed the gap between causal and rational explanations of human actions which means that one must integrate both rational and causal behaviour to understand agency.

Some philosophers like Gilbert Ryle (1949) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) had opposed the causal theory of action before the emergence of Davidson. According to them, one cannot reduce reasons to mere physical forces, rather, reasons serve as explanatory accounts that explain and ground human actions within a moral framework. On the other hand, behaviorists consider action as observable bodily movements often overlooking the individual's personal viewpoint. However, Davidson contended that reason serves both to cause action and to rationalize action. For him, the primary reason for an agent to carry out an action, which is the combination of belief and a desire, offers both the causal process that causes the action and its justification that explains it (Davidson, 1963/1980). These two emphases made it possible for Davidson to defend a comprehensive account of human action that has the possibility of withstanding the weaknesses of both anti-causalism and behaviorism.

This however introduced new challenges, with the problem of deviant causal chains as the most significant. Deviant causal chain is a concept in philosophy of action that takes place when reason causes an action but in the wrong way, thereby breaking the link between action and intention. For example, Ngozi intends to shoot an intruder (reason) with the (desire) for self-defense, (belief) that pulling the trigger will work. But due to extreme anxiety, it causes Ngozi's finger to twitch and fire the gun accidentally. Now the gunshot took place because of Ngozi's mental state, but not in the right way, hence, her action cannot be described as intentional shooting (Franklin, 2021). Issues regarding the adequacy of causal explanation continue: is it possible to capture all intentional actions using a causality-based framework or do some intentional actions need normative, constitutive or non-causal explanations (McDowell, 1996; Tanney, 2013)? These continuing arguments show both the limitations of Davidson and the lasting significance.

The essence of re-examining Davidson's Standard Theory of Action goes beyond non-empirical or speculative philosophy. The connection between responsibility, causation and reasons is central to political and moral discourse. To determine responsibility within the scope of law, one requires to differentiate between coerced conduct, negligent behaviours and intentional actions. Davidson's framework offers tools for examining these differences, however, its weaknesses imply that further clarification is required (Mele, 2022; Hartman, 2023). In addition, within a cross-cultural setting, especially in African philosophy, responsibility and agency are commonly understood as individual reasons, social roles and communal obligations (Gyekye, 1997; Metz, 2017). This generates critical questions on the universal validity of Davidson's theory and to what degree it effectively covers the entire range of human agency.

Therefore, this paper carries out a critical re-examination of the Standard Theory of Action of Davidson, by outlining the philosophical and historical background against which he developed his theory, stressing on the debates with anti-causalism and behaviorism. Then, it offers a comprehensive account of the Standard Theory by explaining its core ideas. The paper progresses further to examine the strengths of Davidson's method prior to considering its main critiques including problems of responsibility and deviant causal chains. A strong attention is

directed towards the intersection of Davidson's theory with the contextualization of agency in culture and law and the contemporary debates about moral responsibility. This paper finally argues that although Davidson's framework remains significant, it must be complemented with contextual and normative dimensions using what I describe as "Contextual-Normative Integration" to offer a more detailed account of human action.

HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF STANDARD THEORY OF ACTION

Davidson's Standard Theory of Action was not developed in isolation, rather it was developed in response to mid-20th-century debate about the nature of reasons, causation and action. Then, philosophers were split into two camps: those who stressed on the internal and normative structure of reasons and those who emphasized on the external and observable features of behavior. His causal theory sought to merge these perspectives by proposing a comprehensive account of intentional action.

Behaviorism had become influential both in philosophy and psychology. Gilbert Ryle (1949) promoted a related critique in "The Concept of Mind." Ryle dismissed the Cartesian idea of dualism, rather sought to clarify mental concepts from the perspective of publicly observable performances and dispositions. According to him, the discussion on reasons and intentions was not about unseen mental causes, however, it was about behavioral dispositions that display cognitive ability. From this standpoint, to perform an action deliberately was not the same as to have one's behavior determined by mental states rather to show judgment, purpose and skill in action. While these approaches pointed to the significance of observable behavior, they failed to account for the first-person aspect of action. Individuals undertaking actions rely on reasons to explain what they are doing, explanations that behaviorist accounts fight to accommodate. This gap paved the way for Davidson's first intervention on action theory.

Along with behaviorist approaches, Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) was another influential figure that rejected causal accounts of action. He argued in "Philosophical Investigations" that reason cannot be reduced to causal explanation. For him, to say that one performs an action "because" of a reason does not equal identifying a causal relation; rather, it offers a reason based on established normative practice. Likewise, in her groundbreaking work "Intention," Elizabeth Anscombe (2000) argued that the notion of intention cannot be subsumed under causal explanation. According to her, intentional actions are those for which the question "Why" can be answered. In this perspective, reasons do not function as internal causes, they express how an agent comprehends and places their action within a particular context. Thus, the anti-causalists maintained that the way actions are explained follows a different grammatical or conceptual structure. Claiming that reasons are the same as causes is simply to create confusion in categories: reasons are normative while causes are naturalistic.

The main philosophical problem of the mid-20th century was how to interpret intentional action to be able to acknowledge both its rational and empirical dimensions. On one hand, agents act

for reasons that render and justify their conduct intelligible, while on the other, they act in the world by way of bodily movements that are open to causal explanation. The challenge was how to reconcile both perspectives while keeping each independent and distinct. Behaviorism could not succeed because its explanation on action theory was too narrow as it abandoned the rationalizing function of reasons. By contrast, anti-causalism gave too much weight to norms or standards but could not explain how it is possible for reason to have a true part in causing or initiating action.

Davidson's essay "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963/1980) challenged the anti-causalist school of thought. He opposed the notion that rational explanations and causal explanations are clearly different from each other. Alternatively, he maintained that reason-based explanations of action are forms of causal explanation. When agents are asked why they acted the way they did, and they give an example of belief-desire combination, this explanation does not only give a justification; it also identifies the cause of their action. Clarifying this position, Davidson proposed the concept of primary reason. This primary reason is made up of a pro-attitude (intention or desire) together with a belief on how the action will bring about the desired outcome. For instance, if I drink a glass of water because I am thirsty (desire) and believe that drinking the water will quench my thirst (belief), this primary reason for drinking water explains and causes my action. For Davidson, this type of explanation is causal specifically because the desire and belief cause the action in a predictable and regular way (Davidson, 1963/1980). By this, Davidson was able to bridge the gap between the empirical and normative dimensions of action under one comprehensive framework.

DAVIDSON'S STANDARD THEORY OF ACTION

The Standard Theory of Action of Donald Davidson, which was originally presented in his seminal essay "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963/1980), ranks among the most controversial and influential theories in the philosophy of action. The theory aims to bring two intuitions into agreement: first, that philosophical explanations must eventually be in harmony with causal explanations in the natural sciences and second, that intentional actions are rationalizable by providing reasons. By identifying reasons as causes, Davidson aimed to uphold a coherent account of action while incorporating it into a largely naturalistic framework.

Central to Davidson's theory is the assertion that one can explain intentional actions using primary reasons which are made up of a pro-attitude (want, desire or commitment) and a belief on how to achieve the said pro-attitude. For example, if Chimcheterem opens her book because she wants to pass her exam (pro-attitude) and believes that reading her book will help her pass (belief), then this pair constitutes her primary reason for taking the action. According to Davidson (1963/1980), this structure is essential for rationalization. Without a corresponding belief, a pro-attitude renders the action incomprehensible, in the same way that a belief without an appropriate pro-attitude does.

Another important element of Davidson's theory is the view that actions are carried out within a specific description. A particular bodily movement can be described in different ways, however, intentional actions cannot be captured by all descriptions. For instance, when I flick a switch, I may also be turning on the light, alerting a burglar, or making a noise all at the same time. The description that counts as intentional action depends on the reason for which the agent performed the action. This perspective was molded by Anscombe's earlier work "Intention" (1957/2000), Davidson however fundamentally transformed it by linking the relevant description to causation. The primary reason for which an agent performed an action explains the action only under a specific description. This connection existing between reason and description prevents action from being explained in simple terms as mere bodily movement and emphasizes the significance of the agent's viewpoint (Bittner, 2001).

The fundamental argument of Davidson's action theory is that reasons are causes. He particularly argued that the main reason behind an agent's action is also the cause of the action given the relevant description. This assertion distinguishes him from non-causal theorists like Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (2009), who analyzed reasons as purely normative or justificatory. His argument was based on three points: (i) Rationalization can be understood as a form of explanation. If you must explain why an agent acted intentionally, you have to identify what made sense of such action by the agent. (ii) Explanations in science are causal. If rationalization truly accounts for explanation, they must also align with the causal model. (iii) Hence, rationalizations are not just made up stories after the fact, they are specific causal explanations. When we give reason for an action, we are also identifying the cause of the action (Davidson, 1963/1980). Through this argument, he bridged a persistent divided position in philosophy of action by affirming that reasons cannot be treated as external justifications added to behavior, rather reasons are part of the causal chain that produces intentional action.

Possibly the bridging of causation and rationalization is the most lasting contribution of Davidson's Standard Theory. Before Davidson, a leading perspective on action theory, especially among philosophers inspired by Wittgenstein and Ryle, was that reasons can be used to explain an action by making sense of them without causing them. However, Davidson (1963/1980) argued that this separation was misleading. This insight brought together two apparently conflicting perspectives. On one hand, it placed reasons in relation to a causal explanatory framework that is compatible with scientific explanation. On the other hand, it retains the commonsensical viewpoint that agents act for reasons that make sense of what they do. According to Stoutland (1986), this combination was a radical shift because it offered a unified theory of explanation that recognizes both empirical causality and rational intelligibility.

Another advantage of Davidson's action theory is that it is compatible with scientific naturalism. By interpreting reasons as causal explanations, he made it possible for unified explanations of human behavior within the scope of wider causal explanations in neuroscience and psychology. This does not mean that reason should be reduced to brain states, rather putting them within a model that allows mental events to function as causes without losing their

normative dimension at the same time (Schlosser, 2019). In today's world, this contribution by Davidson is very relevant as cognitive science advances in its study of the mechanisms of intentional action and decision-making.

DAVIDSON'S STANDARD THEORY OF ACTION AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: A CONTEXTUAL-NORMATIVE ANALYSIS

One of the most significant applications of Davidson's philosophical framework is the relationship between moral responsibility and his causal theory of action. However, within the Western philosophical context, existing analyses have greatly focused on individual agency, thereby overlooking how communal and cultural factors influence both the attribution of moral responsibility and the causal effectiveness of reasons.

His theory of action demonstrates an essential link between moral responsibility and causation by appealing to individual reasons. This individualistic approach however neglects the formation of reasons themselves through social relationships and cultural contexts. For example, in African philosophy of communitarianism, reasons for action are not reducible to mere individual mental states, rather an agent acts based on his obligations and relationships within the community (Gyekye, 1997; Ikuenobe, 2016). The primary reason for an agent to act includes not only the agent's beliefs and desires but also social expectations and communal values that have been embedded into them via cultural practices. For instance, in a traditional African setting where an individual chooses to distribute his personal resources to extended relatives, while Davidson's account will describe the agent's desire to assist others with the belief that sharing his resources will help achieve this action as a primary reason, a contextual-normative analysis demonstrates that reason for action is constituted within the framework of Ubuntu philosophy, meaning that our humanity is inherently linked to the well-being of others (Metz, 2017). The causal effectiveness of the reason for action depends not just on the psychological mental state of the individual but also is rooted in the agent's cultural practices that provide meaning and motivational power to communal values.

The challenge of deviant causal chains has remained a central issue for Davidson's theory, however, a contextual-normative approach offers a distinctive solution. My argument here is that deviant causation arises when reasons bring about action through pathways that disregard culturally affirmed rational processes. In Davidson's standard illustration of the nervous climber, the intention to kill his partner produces not a deliberate action, but an accidental rope slip; the causal pathway is deviant in that it circumvents the rational procedures recognized by culture through which intentions properly produce actions.

Conversely, non-deviant causation acts according to what I describe as "culturally-embedded rational pathways," mechanisms of causation that align with communal understanding of how one can properly connect reasons to actions. These pathways cannot be understood as solely personal mental processes but also socially-constituted processes that are recognized by a culture as proper channels for translating mental states into action. If an agent performs an

action using these pathways, their reasons bring about actions while maintaining intentionality and also support attributes of responsibility (Wiredu, 1996; Appiah, 2005).

Davidson's theory of action gains strength when placed in diverse cultural contexts for understanding agency. Within Western cultures that emphasize individualism, responsibility is centered on the agent's autonomous reasons for action and their causal role in producing outcomes. Responsibility in many African societies however goes beyond individual causation to include communal and relational dimensions (Gbadegesin, 2003; Molefe, 2019). For example, within the framework of Yoruba philosophy, the significance of moral action depends not merely on the reasoning of the individual agent but also on how those conform to ancestral wisdom and communal values. In Davidson's view, an action may be caused by the primary reason of an agent, while the same action can still be morally problematic if it disrespects traditional authority or goes contrary to communal harmony. This means that Davidson's theory can be supplemented with normative considerations that are specific to particular cultures.

Also, the contextual-normative analysis has a significant effect on both moral and legal applications, especially where you have cross-cultural practice. Moral judges and courts should take into consideration not just whether an agent's reason led to their actions but also whether such action occurred through rational pathways that are recognized by the culture. This argument is especially important in cases involving defendants from cultural backgrounds outside the Western context, where the application of Davidson's standard theory may not sufficiently account for how responsible agency is structured (Okafor, 1992; Wiredu, 2009). Additionally, this approach demonstrates that character development and moral education must take cultural context into account. If agents perform actions based on reasons that are determined by cultural norms or practices, then enhancing moral conduct depends not only on focusing on individual desires and beliefs but also on promoting cultural settings that facilitate moral reasoning and virtuous action.

CONTEXTUAL-NORMATIVE THEORY OF ACTION

Even though Davidson's Standard Theory of Action offers a key framework for comprehending intentional behavior, its shortcomings with respect to cultural context, normativity and deviant causation point to the need for further theoretical advancement. I propose a "Contextual-Normative Theory of Action," a framework that maintains Davidson's central idea which holds that reasons function as causes while tackling these shortcomings by systematically integrating normative and cultural factors.

This theory is built on Davidson's causal theory which argues that reasons for action function as causes within culturally-rooted normative structures, instead of treating them as isolated mental states. From this perspective, the primary reason for an agent is not solely about the individual's desires and beliefs but also of culturally-constituted mental states that obtain their motivational force and content from participation in normative traditions and social practices. According to this framework, there are three levels of analysis: (1) Individual Psychology-the

agent's particular intentions, desires and beliefs are treated as mental states; (2) Cultural Constitution-cultural participation shapes mental states and derives meaning from social contexts; and (3) Normative Validation-community standards for assessing the justification of reasons for action and if intentionality is preserved along the causal pathways.

Through the combination of these three levels of analysis, the theory illustrates how reasons can be both normatively significant and causally effective and still remain sensitive to cultural diversity in understandings of agency and responsibility (Bewaji, 2004).

The Contextual-Normative Theory offers a unique solution to the problem of deviant causation by insisting that reasons serve as causes of action via "culturally-validated rational pathways." These pathways reflect the community's understanding of the proper relationship between mental states and behavior to support responsibility attribution and preserve intentionality. In the deviant scenario of the nervous climber, where through an anxiety response that bypasses deliberative control, the agent's intention to kill his partner results in the rope slipping, this pathway is deviant not solely because it entails an aberrant causal route, rather it breaches the cultural understanding of the proper way intentions generate action through deliberate execution that preserves the agent's rational control across the entire pathway, hence making sure the action preserves its intentional character. Conversely, if the climber deliberately releases the rope after forming the intention to kill, then the causal pathway preserves rational control and consequently counts as intentional action instead of deviant chain of action. These mechanisms conform to the community's normative framework for distinguishing intentional action from deviant action, thereby making the behavior genuinely intentional while the agent appears as an appropriate bearer of responsibility (Hallen, 2009; Kaphagawani, 2005).

Through cross-cultural applications, the contextual-normative theory demonstrates explanatory power. Agency and personhood in African Ubuntu philosophy are essentially relational, constituted through one's interconnectedness with others and through one's contributions to the well-being of the community (Menkiti, 1984; Ramose, 1999). Hence, an agent's reason for action within this framework necessarily includes relational obligations and communal impacts. Consider a case when a person in a community influenced by Ubuntu philosophy chooses to pursue higher education; their major reasons are framed not entirely by personal ambition for advancement, rather the individual also has beliefs on how the said education aspiration will help contribute to his family and community well-being. Because this reason is culturally constituted, communal consideration becomes an intrinsic dimension of individual choice, rather than an externally imposed constraint. Conversely, within Western individualistic cultures, reasons are typically framed in terms of self-interest and personal autonomy. The primary motivation of an agent who decides to pursue education may be as a result of career advancement and personal fulfillment, while communal considerations are considered optional or secondary purposes for advancement in life. Although both frameworks offer legitimate modes of constituting reasons for action, they differ in the values and cultural assumptions that underpin them (Shutte, 2001; Eze, 2008).

According to critics of Davidson's action theory, especially McDowell (1996) and Dancy (2000), his causal framework failed to capture the normative dimensions that are central to the basis of moral responsibility. However, this challenge is addressed by the Contextual-Normative Theory by showing that normativity is inherent in the cultural constitution of reasons, instead of being external to explanation. Culturally constituted reasons necessarily embody the normative standards of the community from which they emerge. For instance, the desire of an agent to act courageously derives its content from the cultural conception of what counts as courage and the contexts in which it is deemed appropriate. Similarly, the belief that a particular action manifests courage is contingent on the community's cultural criteria for judging appropriate behavior. When reasons are shaped by culture and cause action through an accepted rational mechanism, the outcome is behavior that is both normatively evaluated and causally explained under the same framework (Gyekye, 2010; Masolo, 2004).

The contextual-normative approach plays an important role in shaping legal and moral theory, especially while examining issues of responsibility or accountability within multicultural settings. The law must consider not only whether defendants' actions were based on reasons that actually led to their behavior, but also whether such reasons functioned within culturally appropriate pathways that embodied legitimate normative positions. This approach proposes modifications to already established legal frameworks: (1) Normative Pluralism-legal systems should recognize legitimate cultural differences in concepts of agency while maintaining fundamental standards for accountability and responsibility; (2) Cultural Competency-legal analysis should understand how various cultural contexts form the bases for action and validate rational pathways; and (3) Contextual Assessment-the cultural framework within which the agent's reasons were formed and executed should be considered before holding the agent responsible for a particular action (Magesa, 1997).

Unlike purely individualistic approaches, the contextual-normative theory provides several advantages in understanding action theory. First, it connects causal explanation with normative evaluation by revealing how cultural constitution renders reasons inherently valuable. Second, it explains how the concepts of responsibility and agency differ across cultures without resorting to relativism or rejecting causal reasoning. Third, it provides frameworks for addressing deviant causation via culturally approved rational routes.

Furthermore, the contextual-normative theory helps in exploring the implications for empirical psychology and cognitive science; examining how globalization affects the cultural constitution of reasons in increasingly multicultural societies; investigating applications to contemporary issues in bioethics and political philosophy; and developing more precise accounts of how cultural participation constitutes mental content (Bell, 2002). Hence, the theory offers a significant development of Davidson's insights without losing his contribution, while at the same time addressing persistent challenges through rigorous focus on normative and cultural dimensions of human agency.

CONCLUSION

Through this re-examination, Davidson's Standard Theory of Action highlights lasting significant influence, while at the same time exposing limitations in addressing present-day challenges in moral responsibility, cross-cultural philosophy and action theory. His primary argument that reasons act as causes of actions remains revolutionary for uniting causal and rational explanation, thereby providing a basis that has shaped philosophical discussion for more than half a century. Successfully, his framework bridges the gap between lived experience and scientific naturalism, hence providing conceptual tools that still illuminate debates about responsibility, rational explanation and intentionality.

This analysis however has shown that Davidson's action theory requires significant development to tackle enduring challenges. The problem of deviant causation reveals the weaknesses of a strictly individualistic perspective of how actions relate to reasons. The issues of normativity reveal how difficult it is to give account for moral judgment when reasons are treated as independent psychological states. The most significant limitation of the theory lies in its individualism that has the tendency to reduce its cross-cultural applicability where responsibility and agency are understood in fundamentally communal or relational terms.

The Contextual-Normative Theory of Action upholds Davidson's causal framework while addressing its limits through integration of normative and cultural dimensions. This approach by maintaining that reasons act causally within the bounds of culturally-embedded norms tackles the issue of deviant causation using culturally-grounded forms of rationality, addresses the challenges of normativity by demonstrating how cultural constitution renders reasons intrinsically open to evaluation and enhances the theory's relevance across cultures by acknowledging legitimate differences in understandings of agency.

The cross-cultural examination of African communitarian and Western individualistic approaches to agency shows that Davidson's theory becomes clearer when examined within the specific cultural context of responsibility, social relationship and rationality. The emphasis on relational personhood and Yoruba tradition's integration of communal and individual dimensions by the Ubuntu philosophy offers important resources for enriching theory of action beyond its Western origins. These insights do not simply extend existing theory, rather they constitute a fundamental reconceptualization that shows how cultural participation shapes the mental states that, according to Davidson, function as the causes of human action.

This theoretical development of action theory has practical significance that goes beyond academic philosophy into the realm of political governance, moral education and legal practice. In today's diverse societies, understanding how cultural differences influence the notions of responsibility and agency becomes very vital for any effective and fair institutions. Hence, the contextual-normative theory offers structured approaches for tackling these challenges while upholding strict standards for accountability and truth.

In addition, these findings demonstrate important directions for further scholarly research. The relationship between engagement in mental content and cultural participation gives room for

deeper investigation, especially as the forces underpinning globalization produce more complex multicultural identities. The implications for both cognitive science and empirical psychology remain to be fully examined, as researchers explore how social environments affect the psychological and neural mechanisms of action execution and decision-making. Also, applying this theory to contemporary issues in political philosophy, international law and bioethics provides potential opportunities for practical advancement of these theoretical practices.

Moving ahead, the philosophy of action must address not only the universal aspects of human agency but also the distinct manners in which diverse cultures structure and understand rational or intentional action. The standard theory of Davidson offers a crucial foundation for investigation, however, it calls for the kind of normative and contextual development that can address contemporary challenges. This contextual-normative framework maintains the explanatory strength and scientific credibility of causal theories while acknowledging the irreducible evaluative and social aspects of human actions.

Conclusively, although Davidson's approach towards action theory faces notable challenges, these difficulties provide an avenue for development rather than grounds for dismissal. One promising direction of such development lies in the contextual-normative theory of action, which offers solutions to long-standing issues while widening the theory's cultural scope. As the discipline of philosophy deepens its engagement with globalization, interdisciplinary collaboration and diversity, frameworks that incorporate cultural sensitivity with causal explanation and ethical or normative evaluation will emerge as critical dimensions of future inquiry. However, according to Davidson, the foundational insights about reasons as causes give an initial framework for further theoretical inquiry, which helps to sustain his enduring significance within philosophical discourse about responsibility and human agency in our globalized world.

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