

**HOW LANGUAGE DEFINES
THE WORLD: ANALYZING A
WITTGENSTEINIAN PERSPECTIVE**

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
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ABSTRACT

Wittgenstein's philosophy reveals a continuous evolution of ideas rather than a stark divide between his early and later works. A harmonized study unveils an intricate connection between language and human life in his works. His insight that language is not merely a static system but an active, dynamic force, embedded in cultural and social practices that shape our understanding of the world, provides a more nuanced and accurate account of linguistic meaning. Together, he provides a comprehensive and realistic perspective on language that offers flexibility to meaning and addresses much philosophical confusion. This paper explores his arguments in some detail. First, it examines the grammar of language and how it shapes our understanding of the world. Second, it analyses Wittgenstein's "picture theory" of language in his early work, where language is seen as mirroring reality, and his later, more practical approach. Finally, it explores the significance of language in contemporary society.

Keywords: Language, World, Grammar, Family Resemblance

Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein is renowned for his ideas on the limits of language. Before him, philosophers argued that language could express anything, but Wittgenstein distinguishes between what can and cannot be said by philosophers. He explores the mystical and the boundaries of language, highlighting different approaches to grammar. In this context, he introduces the concept of family resemblance as a

fundamental critique of traditional approaches to categorization and meaning. This notion provides a flexible and context-sensitive understanding of how we use and comprehend concepts, challenging essentialist definitions and emphasizing the dynamic nature of language.

Wittgenstein significantly influenced the philosophy of language through his early and later works. This also applies to other philosophers, such as early and later

Heidegger. Though Wittgenstein's thought is often divided into two phases—early and later—this paper argues that his work presents a continuous expansion of ideas rather than a fundamental opposition. Contrary to some interpretations, this paper maintains that he did not abandon his earlier ideas but developed them further.

Before Wittgenstein, language was largely seen as a mere representation of reality. Wittgenstein questioned whether language has inherent limits. His work also touches upon religious aspects, but this paper does not focus on those elements. In reading Wittgenstein, his main theme is the limits of language. In his early work, particularly *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein proposed a logical language that could perfectly mirror reality. He attempted to demonstrate how language can depict reality through structured, logical propositions. However, in *Philosophical Investigations*, he redefines language as an expression of forms of life, introducing the idea of language games. He argues that meanings are not inherent in words but are derived from their use in various social contexts. He believed that, given the fluidity of language, words can constantly be created and uncreated within social circles. Despite their differences, both *Philosophical Investigations* and *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* recognize language as an intrinsic part of human life and acknowledge the problems arising from misconceptions about it, where language is an activity of the human form of life.¹

Wittgenstein asserted that “the capability to conceptualize and to be articulate is natural to the human species, on par with walking, eating, drinking, and

playing”² and that “grammar creates human reality.”³ His philosophy is a thorough investigation of the use of language. Wittgenstein's philosophy embarked on a thorough investigation into the use of language. In his earlier philosophical work, he proposed a picture theory of language. In this picture theory, he asserted that language functions as a picture of reality, and each meaningful proposition represents a possible state of affairs in the world “The picture represents a possible state of affairs in the logical space,”⁴ where the logical space becomes the world. He further proposed the logical form of language that enables it to correspond accurately to reality, shared between language and the world. He hinted in the *Tractatus* that “Sentences represent reality in an essentially pictorial manner.”⁵ He further noted that “logic does not itself describe features of reality; rather it is an inevitable by-product of the pictorial mechanism.”⁶ This earlier achievement in his philosophical journey gave him a somewhat incorrect impression that he had dissolved the problems of philosophy. However, he had to make an important turn as he seemed to have awoken from a deep philosophical slumber to the reality that his earlier theory fell short of accounting for certain aspects of language, especially the gestures we sometimes use in our daily communication. For example, how would language as a picture theory validate a person who communicates by “nodding or shaking the head” or “waving a hand in demonstration”?

This is when he realized that there is something more to uncover about the meaning of words, given that there are diverse expressions.⁷ He also realized that

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*. The German text, with a revised English translation, 3rd ed., Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Great Britain: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1953), 8e.

² Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 11e.

³ Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*. The German text, with a revised English translation, 98e, 99e.

⁴ Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1922), 43.

⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Translated by David F. Pears and McGuinness (London: Broadway House, 1961), 9.

⁶ Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 76.

⁷ Wittgenstein Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1953), 109e.

there are some similarities between the uses of words; hence, the invention of the “family resemblance,” a system of language representation to help characterize the similarities between the use of words.⁸ In the *Philosophical Investigations*,⁹ he likens the many uses of language or words to the plurality of games. This made him say that many philosophical problems arise from the uncritical use of language, which is why he says “The thesis that sentences are mere combinations of names and function as descriptions”¹⁰ does not provide an adequate account of the nature and meaning of language related to Augustine's picture and the use of sentences in general.¹¹ His philosophical journey has been marked by a radical shift from his early representational view to his later use-in-context approach, which offers a profound insight into the nature of language and meaning. Indeed, this shift reflects a broader rethinking of how language defines the world. The essence of this paper is to show how humankind can make proper use of clear thoughts and how this clear thought is communicated. This paper will explore his arguments in detail. It is organized as follows: First, it will discuss the grammar of language and how it defines the world. Next, it will examine Wittgenstein's ideas about language concerning the world, analysing instances from his early and later works. This will include a discussion of his early “picture theory” of language, in which language is seen as mirroring reality, and his later, more practical approach. Finally, the paper will explore the importance of these ideas in contemporary society.

The Grammar of Language and How it Defines the World

Wittgenstein focused on how language is

used in philosophy. In his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he attempted to reveal the structure of language. Later, in *Philosophical Investigations*, he developed a more nuanced view, arguing that philosophical inquiry must be grounded in the grammar of language. Regardless of whether one examines his early or later work, grammar remains a crucial concept, as he asserts that grammar determines the use of words, and the use of words conveys meaning.¹²

Since Wittgenstein is concerned with language rather than knowledge, he introduced the concept of language games. Language games are not merely games in the conventional sense; rather, they represent a distinct way in which language is used to serve particular functions. Each community develops ways of speaking that meets its needs, meaning that words acquire meaning based on their specific context. In other words, the implication of a term will depend on its use in a particular context. The use of a word differs from the use of the meaning of the word. Wittgenstein distinguishes between ordinary language and the ideal language of philosophy. Ordinary language is descriptive and truth-bearing, whereas the ideal language of philosophy extends beyond mere representation, encompassing the various functions language performs. Thus, ordinary language has a broader scope than ideal language.

Wittgenstein criticizes philosophers for overgeneralizing the use of language. At the beginning of *Philosophical Investigations*, he references Saint Augustine's view that words gain meaning by referring to objects. Wittgenstein rejects this referential theory of meaning, arguing that it leads to generalization and essentialism. He contends that while essentialist approaches

⁸ Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, 32e.

⁹ Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, 31e-34e.

¹⁰ Baker G. and Hacker P. *An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. I. (Chicago: Chicago University), 57.

¹¹ Baker G. and Hacker P. *An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations*, 57.

¹² Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1953), 29e.

may be suitable for the sciences, they are inadequate for other disciplines. He also challenges the notion of private language, asserting that for language to function effectively, it must have shared rules and consistency. He argues that when philosophers analyse concepts, they usually look for resemblances, so he maintains that philosophers should not look for resemblances, because they may just be part of a family of words.

Another thing is the use of private language. When you consider your feelings, they are more physical states. He argues that the mental state of a person is private. A private language is therefore only applicable to the person who uses it. In this case, what can be asked here is whether private language is possible. For language to work effectively, the use of regularity must occur. For instance, you cannot record in your diary 'A' to have a meaning today. Then tomorrow, the same 'A' has a different meaning. The rules for a private language are based on memory. For him, a private language will not work because you do not have a criterion of correctness. The only criterion you have in private language is memory, but you cannot check your memory with another memory; hence, private language is impossible. Its consequence is that the criterion of correctness is not based on memory but on following the rules of language. So, the only way we can communicate our mental state is by following the language of laws or a language game. Some things cannot be explained,

which he considers mystical.

In his later works, words in a wider perspective meant that words are used in their unique context, which in the end means that such words are proper to the language they belong to.¹³ He differentiates between surface grammar and depth grammar.¹⁴ Surface grammar refers to the syntactic structure of sentences, while depth grammar examines the broader usage and contextual meaning of words. For Wittgenstein, understanding the grammar of language is equivalent to understanding its essence. Hence, he would assert, "Essence is expressed by grammar."¹⁵

Furthermore, he believes there is a tendency for philosophers to "crave for generality."¹⁶ He talks about the similarities and resemblances of words,¹⁷ arguing that the essence of language is that which can be known to every person.¹⁸ It can be found in everything a person may do if one pays close attention to its linguistic structure and how it functions in sentences. By this, what Wittgenstein is putting across is that in all things, there is the need to consider the nature of how things are done in their proper context of usage. This application cannot be found only in ordinary usage of scientific language, but also in religious discourses where the grammar of religious thought must be respected and not be confused with other disciplines.

Language and Its Relations to the World

Wittgenstein's work marked a pivotal shift in 20th-century Western philosophy,

¹³ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations. The German text, with a revised English translation*, 3rd ed., Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Great Britain: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1953), 10e.

¹⁴ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations. The German text, with a revised English translation*, 142e.

¹⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations. The German text, with a revised English translation*, 98e.

¹⁶ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations. The German text, with a revised English translation*, 8e.

¹⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations. The German text, with a revised English translation*, 27e.

¹⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations. The German text, with a revised English translation*,

challenging traditional views on meaning and reality. In *Tractatus*, he stated, “The universe is the totality of facts, not of things.”¹⁹ He proposed the picture theory of language, asserting that language and reality share a structural correspondence. According to this theory, propositions act as logical pictures of the world. Instead, our understanding of the world is shaped by the diverse “language games” we partake in. Each language game has its own distinct rules, governing the usage and interpretation of words within specific contexts.²⁰

He maintains that the world is not a collection of all objects but a list of all facts. This establishes the context for him to develop the “picture theory” of language, which posits that language and reality share a structural correspondence. According to this theory, propositions function as logical pictures of the world. Just as an image represents a particular scene, a proposition represents a situation or a state of affairs. Wittgenstein argues that the essential function of language is to describe facts, and for a proposition to be meaningful, it must depict a possible datum.²¹ According to Wittgenstein, the relationship between language and the world is rooted in the fact that language mirrors the logical structure of reality. He posits the theory of elementary propositions to establish this correspondence between language and the world. “The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.”²² From this, we can infer that these are the simplest

meaningful propositions, composed of names that stand for objects and depict a possible state of affairs. Here, we see a parallel with Wittgenstein's nature of the state of affairs in Proposition 2.03: “In a state of affairs, objects fit into one another like the links of a chain.”²³

However, this view was later criticized, including by Wittgenstein himself. His *Philosophical Investigations* abandoned the rigid picture theory, favouring a more dynamic, use-based language understanding. He introduced the concepts of language games and family resemblance to demonstrate that words acquire meaning through their use in specific social practices. He famously stated, “The meaning of a word is its use in the language.”²⁴

It can be noted that, for Wittgenstein, the world is fully describable by language, but only insofar as it can describe facts. The structure of propositions must match the structure of the facts they represent. This limits what can and cannot be said since language is limited to what can be pictured — facts and their logical arrangements. It is therefore not surprising when Wittgenstein asserts, “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world,”²⁵ implying that anything that cannot be represented in language, such as metaphysical or ethical truths, lies outside the realm of meaningful discourse.

Ultimately, while Wittgenstein's early work provides a fundamental framework for understanding how language represents reality, it also faces some criticisms, some of

¹⁹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Translated by David F. Pears and McGuinness (London: Broadway House, 1961), 5.

²⁰ Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1967), 88e.

²¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Translated by David F. Pears and McGuinness (London: Broadway House, 1961), 9.

²² Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 36.

²³ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 9.

²⁴ Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1967), 88e.

²⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Translated by David F. Pears and McGuinness (London: Broadway House, 1961), 68.

which he notes in his later works. Apart from the fact that his early view of the world fails to account for the complexities of language use, it also assumes a one-to-one correspondence between language and the world, which may not always be the case. Indeed, while reviewing Wittgenstein's works, Kenny shows the inconsistencies in Wittgenstein's view and highlights that Wittgenstein does not show how "the picture connects with the reality it represents."²⁶ Wittgenstein argues that one key problem with the picture theory is its failure to account for the complexity of language in everyday use.²⁷ To address this, he introduces the concepts of "language game" and "family of resemblance" to explain how words acquire meaning through their use in specific social practices. Indeed, these concepts emphasize that language is not a static system of representation, but a dynamic, rule-governed activity embedded in various forms of life.²⁸ A "language game" is a game, illustrating that language functions differently in different contexts. Here, the meaning of words is not fixed by their relationship to objects in the world, as Wittgenstein had held, but is instead determined by how they are used in different interactions. At this point, there is a fundamental shift from his earlier perspective, as he transitions from a theory of language that focuses on representation to one that emphasizes the practical use of language in everyday situations. This should not be construed as a repudiation of the *Tractatus*, but rather a continuation or an expansion of his understanding of language and its essence in the world. In his revised position, Wittgenstein viewed language as a tool for various purposes where the meaning of a word is not to be determined by its

intrinsic properties but by its functions within a particular language game. To this, he emphasizes that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language."²⁹ This notion reflects his continuous idea that language functions by mirroring reality. Instead, meaning arises from the specific ways words are used within particular "forms of life" — the social and cultural practices that shape how language functions.³⁰ In other words, Wittgenstein supports a social perspective on language. This viewpoint enables a more flexible understanding of language and its connection to the world. It emphasizes that our use of language is crucial to our interactions and experiences, highlighting the significance of context in establishing meaning.

This movement of ideas from the *Tractatus* to the *Philosophical Investigations* has profound implications. It highlights the flexibility of language and the role of social context in shaping meaning. It also suggests that many philosophical problems arise from linguistic confusion rather than genuine metaphysical dilemmas. By analysing how language is used, Wittgenstein dissolves many traditional philosophical disputes. His rejection of the supernatural approach suggests that he re-evaluated the purpose and method of philosophy, directing it towards a more pragmatic and descriptive framework. Thus, urging philosophers to dissolve metaphysical problems by doing away with explanations and examining how language is used.³¹

Wittgenstein's use of family resemblance is part of his broader therapeutic approach to philosophy. Instead of constructing rigid definitions, he seeks to dissolve philosophical confusion by

²⁶ Kenny, Anthony. *Wittgenstein* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 56.

²⁷ Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1967), 3e.

²⁸ Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, 11e.

²⁹ Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, 21e.

³⁰ Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, 8e.

³¹ Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, 27e.

clarifying how language is used. Recognizing the family resemblance among concepts helps alleviate the philosophical anxiety that arises from searching for strict definitions where none exist. Many philosophical problems, Wittgenstein argues, stem from misunderstandings about language. In *Philosophical Investigations*, he talks about a game.³² Wittgenstein focused on illustrating his point about how similarities crop up and disappear. He says this results in “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.”³³ According to him, “I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblance' for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, temperament overlap and crisscross in the same way 'games' form a family.”³⁴

By showing that concepts like 'game' do not need strict definitions, he aims to resolve these confusions and provide a clearer view of our linguistic practices. The notion of family resemblance suggests that general terms (like 'proposition' and 'language') do not have a single, unifying essence but rather share overlapping similarities among different instances, akin to a family where members share various traits without all having the same features. He tells us to think of the word 'game,' there's no single feature that defines all games. Some games involve competition, others are solitary, some have rules, and others are more free form. What unites them is a web of overlapping similarities.

Significance of Language to Contemporary Society

Bertrand Russell, who was the first to have supported and defended the *Tractatus*,

stressing that Wittgenstein had solved all philosophical problems, became sceptical about Wittgenstein's assertion that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”³⁵ As a trained mathematician, he believed that metaphysics was obscure and unattainable. He did not reject metaphysics but rather worked to strengthen the language of metaphysics, and so his scepticism grew stronger on these metaphysical and mystical statements that Wittgenstein asserted. Karl Popper cannot be left out when it comes to those who critique Wittgenstein. Popper argues against too much emphasis on language games concerning the nature of philosophical problems. By this, what Popper argued was that philosophical difficulties could be purely linguistic challenges. This means that linguistic problems in philosophy exist. For instance, the problem of induction is purely philosophical.

On his part, although he appreciated the linguistic insights of Wittgenstein, he argued that the later philosophy of Wittgenstein was unconcerned with the notion of formal logic and focused too much on the ordinary usage of language. A.J. Ayer considered the *Tractatus* unattractive, despite that he did admire it. His criticism of Wittgenstein occurred when he rejected his own work, which for him meant a philosophical withdrawal. When we consider the continental thinkers who came after, like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Martin Heidegger, this paper argues that they would have hardly appreciated Wittgenstein's early work, but concerning how language shapes thought, which became central in his later work, this would have been accepted by Derrida and Foucault in terms of deconstruction and genealogical analysis. Heidegger, who also criticizes traditional metaphysics, would have indirect

³² Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, 31e.

³³ Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, 32e.

³⁴ Wittgenstein Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, 32e.

³⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1922), 189.

dialogue with Wittgenstein since both explored the issue of silence and the limits of language. Even though Heidegger's approach was through the analysis of Being or the question of the meaning of Being, and poetry,³⁶ Wittgenstein's analysis of being is formal logic as a picture of reality. Anscombe, who was a student and a translator, clarified some misconceptions on a BBC Radio Talk in 1953, that it is misconstrued to believe that Wittgenstein supported and defended ordinary language philosophy as a practice during his time.

His investigation into the nature of meaning, the various ways in which language can be used socially, and the limits of language offers insightful perspectives on communication ethics in cultural and political discourse, and of course, artificial intelligence. The logical form or logical structure that underlies language in his early work had an impact on the development of logical positivism and the entire analytic tradition. Despite its rigidity, this remains useful in modern society when examining language and reality in the quest for truth in the digital age, where misinformation and disinformation have become widespread.

This rigidity of language was transformed into fluidity in the *Philosophical Investigations*, where he introduced "language-games," emphasizing the context-based use of language, which is why he asserts that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language."³⁷ This shows that language is a form of life within human activity. This is particularly significant considering the rapid technological changes and multicultural lifestyle we lead. And his criticism about the meaning or possibility of private language³⁸ is an invitation to critically assess whether machines can genuinely understand language regarding

human sensibility.

The rejection of fixed essences by Wittgenstein is an area that poses a big challenge to the absolutists and the universalists. This is essential since it has a lot of implications on the postmodern and poststructuralist philosophical investigation, more importantly, when it comes to cultural studies and critical theory. Another point of consideration is how language is used as a social norm within society. It is the fabric of every society, since it goes to show how language shapes and reflects the behaviour of the people. This is crystal clear, the way people talk and debate over political and chieftaincy litigations, negotiations in multi-party societies through identity and inclusion. In the world of AI, Wittgenstein's philosophy is crucial when we consider contextual meaning to algorithms, data, AI, and anything to do with online transmission. It is through this that we distinguish between what is pragmatic and literal through a natural process of language.

For instance, when it comes to the use of language in the world of practicality, one must know the rules of the language being used, just as there is a need to know the rules of a game to play or to think of teaching someone how to play. Language aims to convey meaning, and as such, language, when used, must depict the concepts used in describing a phenomenon. Knowing the relationship between language and our thoughts as well as the world will help us understand Wittgenstein's rationale for writing the *Tractatus*. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein aimed at giving a picture of the world using language. He believed language could be used in the description of the true picture of the world. He held onto this position because he argued that most of the philosophical problems scholars had

³⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Incorporated, 1962), 24.

³⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*. *The German text, with a revised English translation*, 3rd ed., Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Great Britain: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1953), 43.

³⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Philosophical Investigations*, pp. 243-271.

grappling with were just problems that arose out of the misuse of language. How language is employed to bring out meaning in its ordinary usage. This is important in the sense that what is described as nonsense could only be arrived at through the use of language.

The challenges arise from the assumption that language must conform to rigid structures. By emphasizing the fluidity and context-dependent nature of meaning, he provides a framework that promotes philosophical clarity and prevents miscommunication. His work underscores that language is integral to social interaction, shaping personal and collective understanding. Therefore, the significant implication of Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' is to address the flaws in the assumptions that language must conform to a strict general form. Employing this concept 'of family resemblance', Wittgenstein challenged traditional views of language as a tool for representing reality and demonstrated how flexible and varied our language and concepts can be, moving away from rigid definitions to emphasize its practical, fluid, contextual, and social nature. Thus, Wittgenstein embraces "Family resemblance" in his theory of language to help explain how words can have multiple meanings within different language games, making communication more adaptable and nuanced. In other words, Wittgenstein's embrace of 'family resemblance' enables philosophical clarity.

Another significance is from a cultural and social perspective. It highlights how language reflects cultural and social practices; different communities might use the same word in varying ways, and understanding these variations can lead to deeper insights into cultural and social dynamics and encourage open-mindedness and flexibility in thinking. Furthermore, it prompts us to consider that our understanding of the world is shaped by a network of similarities and differences, promoting a more inclusive and comprehensive view.

He emphasizes that language is not merely a collection of independent words and sentences, but a complex system of interrelated elements governed by rational principles. He argues that the meaning of language is grounded in its connection to the world and that the logical structure of language reflects the logical structure of reality. But the change in his later philosophy as Wittgenstein delved into the logical structure of language through the analysis of language games that govern them and argued that different forms of language correspond to different language games, each with its own rules and logic should not be construed as a rejection of his early work, but a continuous fluidity of how language is as he initially conceived in the *Tractatus*.

According to him, life is a public space and not a private space owned by anyone, where every language user participates in an interrelated linguistic network. Wittgenstein's views on the intrinsic link between language and life can be seen as a critique of earlier philosophical traditions that are rigid and formalistic; that treated language as a more isolated abstract system. This significant shift is not from philosophical traditions but to continue to seek a more practical way, where language mirrors reality through logical structure. A view that aligned with logical positivism. Thus, language also serves as a bridge between the world and human beings. Language is therefore a form of life through the idea of language games. Wittgenstein transitioned from viewing language as a logical structure to recognizing its social and practical functions. He denied the possibility of private language, arguing that language must exist within a shared framework to be meaningful. His philosophy, therefore, presents language as a public activity that binds individuals within a linguistic community.

To conclude, Wittgenstein's investigation of language remains a profound framework not only in the analytic tradition but also in the contemporary world.

His examination of context-based use, how language functions serve as a salient point of communication, and so an encounter with the Tractatus should not be construed only as a philosophical activity, but rather a practical necessity for clarity in everything. Wittgenstein's ideas have influenced various fields, including cognitive science, linguistics, and artificial intelligence. His rejection of essentialist definitions in favour of family resemblance aligns with how human cognition and categorization work in real-world settings. His insights emphasize that language is not a static system but a dynamic, evolving tool embedded in cultural and social practices.

Conclusion

Wittgenstein's philosophical journey reveals a continuous evolution of ideas rather than a stark divide or repudiation between early and later phases. While his early work focused on the logical representation of reality, his last work emphasized language's social and contextual aspects. His notion of family resemblance provides a valuable perspective on how concepts function in language, offering a flexible and realistic approach to meaning. Together, they provide a comprehensive understanding of how language functions. Wittgenstein's views are often unclear and sometimes unsupported, but his position on the analogy of 'family resemblance' appears brilliant because he suggested that concepts are frequently connected by overlapping similarities, much like the resemblances found within a family. Wittgenstein uses his notion of 'family resemblance' to explain that language functions in various ways without a universal essence or common traits that define it. Rather than relying on fixed essences for example, he emphasizes that understanding language requires recognizing its varied uses in context to avoid miscommunication.

Ultimately, Wittgenstein's philosophy highlights the intricate connection between language and human life. His work demonstrates that language is not merely a

passive medium of communication but an active force that shapes our understanding of the world. By recognizing language as a form of life, we can appreciate its profound role in defining human experience. By rejecting the search for essential definitions and highlighting the overlapping similarities among instances of thought, he provides a more nuanced and accurate account of linguistic meaning. This approach addresses philosophical confusion and aligns more closely with everyday language using a flexible and context-dependent nature. This makes language and life intricately woven together. And so, as an activity, language shows a form of life throughout our linguistic activity.

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