

A CRITIQUE OF SARTRE'S HERMENEUTIC PERSPECTIVE ON FREEDOM AND DEATH

Orji, Chidi Paul, Ph.D.

Department of Philosophy

University of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences

Umuagwo, Imo State

hipaulco@gmail.com; paul.orji@uaes.edu.ng

Abstract

The human being is unquestionably a free entity. He is a thoughtful individual with the capacity to make crucial choices that have an impact on his own and other people's lives. These talents demonstrate how a person's free will may definitely change some aspects of their lives. However, there are inescapable aspects of everyday life that limit or even seem to take away a person's freedom and capacity for decision-making. The hermeneutic method is used in this essay. The concept and practice of interpretation is known as hermeneutics. This approach is regarded suitable in this case since it makes explaining Sartre's views about freedom and death reasonably convenient. This essay's main goal is to hermeneutically consider two key and closely related aspects of Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism: freedom and death. Based on Sartre, a man first exists and then autonomously determines his nature via conscious choices. However, he regards death as a reality that forbids freedom and occurs independently of the decisions made by a person. This article seeks to show how, in Sartre's theories, freedom and death may be related. The logical and moral plausibility of Sartre's assertion that death is the only thing that can limit a person's total freedom is investigated. By making an effort to provide a better interpretation of Sartre's standpoint, the study work's primary objective is to reduce its inconsistencies.

Keywords: Sartre, Freedom, Death, Consciousness, Existentialism

Introduction

Free will and determinism seem to coexist in a beneficial and unbreakable way. They resemble one another more than two sides of the same coin, in my opinion. Anywhere that there is free will and determinism exists. It is said that Jean-Jacques Rousseau said, "Man is born free but everywhere in chains" (Rousseau, 1968: i), which may have been the consequence of his understanding of this recognized truth. This researcher's interest in Sartre's notion of freedom in light of the inevitability of death was sparked by a similar realization.

Despite the heated debate between the opposing perspectives of those who believe in free will and determinism, the researcher is especially interested in finding out the cryptic relationship between free will and determinism, which is actually rather obvious. The current researcher's philosophical focus had always been on this, until understanding Sartre's stunning assertion that man is fully free and that his existence comes before his essence. He must first exist in order to choose his course. Sartre's stance is radical since it totally discounts determinism's effects or role in shaping human life.

The researcher is compelled to learn what prompted Sartre to take this extreme viewpoint and how it has shaped or influenced his understanding of things like death, birth, luck, and other aspects of human life that are fixed or given but not largely the outcome of human choice or freedom. Be aware that determinism, a philosophical viewpoint, maintains that all events, including moral judgments, are completely predestined by previously existing causes (Britanica Emcy, 2017). Determinism is generally seen as prohibiting free will since it suggests that humans are incapable of acting otherwise than how they now behave. The idea holds that the cosmos is completely logical and that perfect knowledge of any given state guarantees that perfect knowledge of its future is equally possible.

Contrarily, the term "free will" refers to a person's capacity or authority to act or decide without being restricted by the dictates of society, the natural world, or divine law (Britanica Emcy, 2017). Determinists in general deny the existence of free agency. The cornerstone of arguments in favor of free will is the belief that everyone is universally responsible for their own actions, which is the basis of concepts like reward, punishment, and motivation (Britanica Emcy, 2017). These arguments are further supported by sentiments of subjective freedom, guilt, revealed religion, and the acceptance of this responsibility. Sartre absolutized free will, making a person the ultimate judge or decision-maker of his or her actions, intentions, and goals.

Given the basic or utmost significance of free will, he clarified that man is inescapably destined to live out his decisions. Only a person's choices may determine what that individual is really like or worth. Sartre seems to be saying that people have choices in any circumstance. If that's the case, why, in his opinion, does freedom cease to exist once we pass on? Despite knowing that some events, like as death, inevitably take away a person's capacity for choice or decision-making, Sartre believes that freedom is absolute. The researcher's motivation and choice of this study topic were motivated by the astonishment

around the free will-determinism paradox and Sartre's radical attitude, which are both conveyed in these queries.

Sartre's Philosophical Doctrine on Freedom and Death: An Overview

To deliver man from the impersonal, transcendental, and abstract rationalism of conventional philosophy was one of Sartre's Humanistic Existentialism's main goals. Sartre created his phenomenological ontology, which he embraced to restore the dignity of man that had been lost in the transcendental and mystical metaphysics of medieval philosophy, in order to carry out this objective. A detailed examination from the metaphysical plane indicates that Sartre appears to have done more harm to man and to metaphysics than good. Sartre's whole philosophy is based on two ideas: postulatory atheism and Husserl's premise of a self-sufficient phenomenology.

Sartre refutes the existence of the invisible using the phenomenological technique. He disavowed God, human nature or essence, soul and spirit, ego, and other concepts. In phenomenology, what is seen is what is real. Thus, Sartre's construction of a new type of dualism in philosophy is one of the metaphysical implications of his postulations on absolute freedom. His theory asserted that it had resolved the perennial philosophical conundrum of duality between essence and appearance. However, as Grimseley rightly pointed out in his Existentialist Thought, another dualistic issue still exists after the old dualism has been dispelled: "'Appearance' is not separated from 'being' as formerly, but there still remains the issue of relating the single appearance which 'is' now to the other appearances which it is not but to which it is indissolubly linked. The being of that appearance still has to be defined, even though the phenomena have been reduced to a "appearance" (Grimseley, 1960:91).

The sad and painful stripping away of the human ego's ontological and psychological richness and vitality by reducing it to a mere *res cogitans* is another metaphysical significance of Sartre's perspective resulting from his confinement of human existence to the one sphere of consciousness (Reinhardt, 1960:167). To view man as nothing more than consciousness would be extremely sad. Sartre's anthropological perspectives are nonetheless as constrained as Descartes'. Accepting Sartre's ontological viewpoints entails merely rejecting conventional metaphysics. This is due to Sartre's dogmatic positing of his own words in his phenomenological ontology while rejecting the issues raised by conventional metaphysics.

He rejected the notions of essence philosophy, substance and accidents, act and potency, and the separation between being and its expression. Then there is Sartre's dogmatic and unsupported postulation of the two modes of being, as well as his misuse of terms like contingency, necessity, absurdity, and facticity. No one can accept Sartre's unsupported claims without either tacitly or overtly rejecting conventional metaphysics or its main issues. The characteristics necessary to make up consciousness are absent from the being-in-itself in Sartre's phenomenological ontology. It wouldn't act as a causal purposive actor in the creation of a zone of subjectivity since it is by nature inert and purposeless.

However, it is indicated that everything proceeds as though being's main goal were to create nothingness. According to critics, Sartre's decision to relegate this question to the realm of metaphysics signifies his admission of being unable to address one of philosophy's most important problems (Collins, 1964:62). Additionally, it indicates that the division between ontology and metaphysics gives him a way to avoid being scrutinized for the problems his theory of being causes. Sartre disregarded the existential question, which is the crux of philosophy. To the disadvantage of being, he was consumed with being-in-itself and being-for-itself. He disregarded Heidegger's more fundamental claim that existence precedes being.

This is the case that man cannot exist without the wide expanse of existence upon which he may stand and project himself. Because Sartre's existentialism is unaware of this priority of being, William Barret accuses it of being like Cartesian thinking and being "locked up in the human subject" (Barret, 1962:248). Sartre maintained true to his new humanism, which leaves man without a basis, by refusing to engage in the concerns of contemporary philosophy (the issue of how the subject and object may be; the search for the truth of existence and the root of man). Barrett (1962:248).

This unpleasant omission implies that his Humanistic Existentialism, which is a phenomenological study of human life devoid of an ontological base, is nothing more than a castle in the air. Sartre asserts that there are no interpretations other than those that are proposed by man himself in the opening pages of his major work *Being and Nothingness*. This indicates that there can be no issue about a potential connection between human meanings and the meaning of being that exists outside of phenomenology. This strategy, which Roberts claims may be based on a "gratuitous assumption," is a hint to Sartre's steadfast belief that the non-human in and of itself is utterly worthless (Roberts, 1959:197-198).

Most people thought that one of Sartre's main contributions to our understanding of freedom and mortality is his atheism. According to Sartre, the absence of God is as vital as breathing. It is a significant stance that supports his whole philosophical framework. Sartre believed that in order to affirm man, God had to be rejected. His postulational atheism is used to support his assertion that man has total freedom. Freedom and responsibility have no boundaries without God. It must be noted right away that Sartre interpreted the idea of the "divine mind" extremely literally and anthropomorphically as meaning what his phenomenological inquiry into consciousness has shown.

There can be no "consciousness" away from the world since, as we noted earlier, consciousness is always that of something. Because it assumes the presence of a subject (God) before there were things, this anthropomorphism led Sartre to reject the idea that God created the universe out of nothing. The issue arises because, according to Sartre's dogmatism, the concept of awareness producing its own objects is incompatible with the concept of consciousness itself (Roberts, 1959:197-214). The main issue with Sartre is that he disallows other creatures, such as God and the more primitive animals, to have awareness.

Since they are neither being-in-itself nor being-for-itself, they are neither. It is hard to see God (a being-for-itself) creating the universe since even in his attempt to assign awareness to God, he only attributed human consciousness to God. The idea of a God who exists inside the human realm of existence, a God who thinks and acts just like a human in everything, is constantly implicit in Sartre's entire theory. Therefore, such a God is unable to explain everything's existence. The flaw of Sartre's argument is that he assumed that "whatever is true of human consciousness must be carried over unmodified into the connotations of the idea of God" (Roberts, 1959:197-214). The inability of Sartre to reconcile faith in God with the reality of man's unrestricted freedom is another major issue that drove him to atheism. Sartre made the mistake of being an atheist because he believed there were only two options. He has two choices. The first is rationalism, which attempts to infer existence from essence and thereby renders determinism inevitable by making every existing reliant on God. Freedom eventually disappears as a result of this. The second choice is atheism, which rejects God and promotes man as the maker of moral standards and the possessor of unrestricted freedom.

A description of human nature that incorporates freedom rather than considering it "prior" to it is what is genuinely required, but Sartre falls short of providing it. With this definition, we may argue that man obtains the ability to be free from God and that his use of freedom is either a proper use of this gift or a misuse of it. Given that we cannot characterize our existence on earth as being marked by agony and a sense of abandonment (emotions resulting from the nonexistence of God in the cosmos and the ultimate freedom of man), Sartre's rejection of God's existence is shown to be nothing more than an illusion.

The absurdity of human life, as Sartre himself admitted, is implied by such misleading cognition. If Sartre is serious when he says that having to confront life without supernatural assistance makes him unhappy and that he finds it "very distressing that God does not exist" (Sartre, 2007:294), if he is being real and not just sarcastic in expressing this viewpoint, then there are two implications. First of all, it emphasizes the idea that if God is real, He speaks to people via their internal selves, their consciences, and their choices. Second, it indicates that Sartre's ontology leads him to believe that human decision is the only factor at play in the world.

However, if the existence of God is consistent with freedom, "then Sartre's account of man's longing to be (like) God may take on a quite different significance" (Roberts, 1959:219). He makes the assumption that religious belief is nothing more than projection rather than communication. The abolition of religion, which Sartre views as separating man from his freedom and responsibility, is a vital symbol of his entire postulation on freedom and death. For Sartre, Nietzsche, and Marx, the concept of God and nature must be eradicated in order to free man since they are his greatest enemies.

Only after doing this would man is aware of his freedom and the responsibilities that come with it. Only at this point is it possible to free man from his ill faith. Furthermore, since there is no guarantee of an afterlife into which death can be a gateway, it is only at this point that death can be properly regarded as a restriction on freedom. Man's religious feelings are meaningless without God. The position of a religious being is no longer attainable for man. All religious responsibilities, including praying to God and attending church, will be eliminated.

Despite the fact that Sartre never meant his major work *Being and Nothingness* to be a book on morality, the majority of his claims about the unbridled freedom of man made in this book have greater moral ramifications than those made in

most works on ethics. An examination of Sartre's assertion of the ultimate freedom of man and his denial of all human nature concepts reveals the connection between these ideas and his rejection of the very influential school of ethical thinking that bases moral values on human nature.

Moral judgements, in Sartre's opinion, lack any objective meaning whatsoever if they are denied any supernatural foundation in a divine purpose and are not anchored in human nature. They can be seen as "expressions of choices or preferences" in their most basic form (Baldwin, 1987:290). This interpretation of Sartre is supported by his anti-naturalistic views in the article Existentialism is Humanism. "Are we given any values or commands that could justify our behavior if God does not exist?" he asks. As a result, we are without any grounds for defense or excuse in the brilliant world of values (Sartre, 2007:295). Sartre had previously stated that making a decision is an affirmation of the worth of the option chosen since we consistently opt for the good and avoid the evil (Sartre, 2007:291). The aforementioned stances, which are important to Sartre's argument, portray his ethics as a form of "emotivism" or "prescriptivism" in which judgments of worth are primarily expressive or prescriptive rather than descriptive (Baldwin, 1987:290).

In the absence of objective ethical standards, if man is his own judge, if he alone creates values, if he is his own legislator- as Sartre claims- where can we find the solid foundation for civilized communal living? Sartre's unbridled individuality and unrestricted freedom present issues that cannot be easily disregarded by arguing that a man's decisions affect all men equally. The decision to devote oneself is the same as the decision to represent humanity as a lawmaker.

Sartre's sudden shift from defending his own freedom to defending that of others is highly insulting. He had already demonstrated that this was impossible. He disavowed human nature, which might have been used as a foundation for the idea that what is good for one person is good for mankind in general. The "we-feeling" is predominantly portrayed in Sartre's analysis of interpersonal interactions as a source of conflict and egoism, which poses a danger to freedom. How then can Sartre defend his shift to the idea that love and friendship might be "the fruition instead of the frustration of freedom" (Roberts, 1959:223).

In light of the fact that there is no universally accepted standard of measuring and that each person creates his own standards of worth, we might also wonder how we can determine what is best for all people. How is the worth of others

known to us? The question of whether man is truly nice and benign enough to be trusted with such a responsibility has also been pressed repeatedly by critics. Can anybody be rightfully accused of wrongdoing if everyone makes their own values-based decisions freely and honestly on the same moral issue? Can we accept the first guy's morally sound assessment of tax evasion as an objective moral criterion if, for instance, one man believes it to be bad and another that it is right?

What exactly can we conclude about the other man's frank and impartial judgment? Sartre's perspective has many ramifications, and further research reveals Sartre's difficulties and ethical ambiguity as a result of his view of man's unrestricted freedom. Sartre brings out "the spirit of seriousness" – a type of poor faith—for specific emphasis in his critique of traditional ethics. He claims that this mindset makes it appear as though the distinction between good and evil has already been established axiomatically and that no more ethical innovation is required.

Nothing else than a denial of a universal moral norm is implied by Sartre's viewpoint. With regard to him, man is not constrained by any objective moral laws in how he conducts himself. In some instances, man is free to make whatever choice he wishes. Using the example of a young guy who had to choose between caring for his mother in occupied France and going to join the Resistance in England, he attempted to convince the audience that this was the case. A priori moral standards cannot assist the young guy in finding a solution to his problem, he said in conclusion. In her critique of Sartre's article *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, she said that the essay failed to address the previous criticism that there could not possibly be an existentialist morality since man is only able to judge the world for himself. She also criticized the superficial Kantian moral theory it contained because it is virtually impossible to imagine "the true existentialist man taking responsibility for anyone's choice except his own" or adopting the Kantian view that views men as being treated as ends in themselves, as Sartre later realized and regretted the publication.

It is "the spirit of seriousness" or bad faith to hold this position. She came to the conclusion that this article cannot accurately represent Sartre's moral theory or Existentialism as a whole. Sartre reached a deadlock as a result of the implications of his views on responsibility and freedom, even at the book's conclusion. Any attempt to present ethics in a generic manner will only be made in "the spirit of seriousness" or with evil intentions. The one undisputed fact is

that values were particular, individualized decisions made by the person for himself alone. Because these indicate ill faith, there are no unchanging truths or unalienable rights. Sartre's existentialism can only advocate that each man must save himself by deciding on his own life of freedom in the face of this chaotic social and moral stalemate. Sad to say, this seems to be the conclusion of Sartre's ethical philosophy.

Herbert Marcuse Position on Sartre's Concept of Death

Given that the *pour-soi* is always accountable for the decisions it takes in a circumstance, Marcuse claims that Sartre shies away from actual freedom (Marcuse, 1948:309). According to Sartre, the person is free even in 'extreme' circumstances like residing under a totalitarian government. Because to make freedom "ontological" is really to conspire with the ideological, Marcuse argues that freedom cannot simply be "ontological" in the traditional philosophical sense of the word. Regardless of the economic or political circumstances in which the *pour-soi* finds itself, one is still free to act in a different way and is still accountable for the decisions they make (Marcuse, 1948:309).

On the other hand, if such a "ontological" foundation for freedom somehow predates political, economic, or social freedom, then this may cause us to accept our already-predetermined "role" in society. In any case, if Pierre- the renowned waiter from Sartre's chapter on poor faith (*Mauvaise Foi*) in *Being and Nothingness*- is a *pour-soi* who just "plays" at being a waiter, he won't feel like he is reduced to a simple instrument: a server of food. However, as Marcuse points out, "neither his part nor his interpretation is of his own free choosing" when Pierre "acts out" (plays a café waiter in the play), according to Marcuse (Marcuse, 1948:326).

Accepting a purely ontological understanding of freedom might ultimately lead to a communal rejection of actual freedom, including biological, political, economic, and social liberty. The three main facets of who we are – our body, our legacy, and even our death- are included by Sartre's idea of death as something that is "outside of freedom." According to Marcuse, dying may represent freedom, serve as motivation, and even serve as a noble aim for those who are involved in what he refers to as "the Great Refusal" (Marcuse, 1948:327).

Marcuse's concept of "The Great Refusal" is widely and intentionally unclear. Consider the Great Refusal as a new ethos for the modern subject to have a better understanding of this idea. "The Great Refusal" refers to a deliberate rejection of

negative and cynical portrayals of humanity and contemporary society in general. It involves refusing to accept so-called "realistic" or "pragmatic" explanations of how society and the individual within it operate. To have confidence in utopian possibilities is, in other words, to do so.

For instance, Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* might be seen as an ongoing effort to argue against Freud's somewhat gloomy and dystopian interpretation of the human state as portrayed in *Civilization and its Discontents*. According to Freud, the human animal is unable to escape their dissatisfaction in society. The epic and never-ending conflict between Thanatos, the want to kill, and Eros, the need to love, is only manifested in humans as physical manifestations. This conflict, according to Freud's description in the last chapter, is fought on the ontogenetic (the person plane) and phylogenetic (the species plane) levels of human life (Freud, 1967:34).

Marcuse's premise in *Eros and Civilization* is that we must "refuse" Freud's explanation of the beginning and "end" of civilization, despite the fact that it initially seems "sensible" and "realistic." Marcuse effectively argues that Thanatos and Eros are not diametrically opposed to one another but rather may be reconciled in a paragraph from the second-to-last chapter titled "Eros and Thanatos" (Marcuse, 1948:320). Marcuse disputes Freud's assertion that the fight between Eros and Death is an unending one (Freud, 1967:34).

As opposed to this, Marcuse suggests that the conflict between these two powerful forces is contingent and historical (Marcuse, 1966:235-236). It is conceivable to reach a level of satisfaction, where every person's wants and needs may be met, as society advances (in terms of technical development). The Performance Principle and Reality Principle would no longer apply to the person, and neither would they apply to the Ego. Instead, Marcuse contends, the Id's long-forgotten, self-regulatory mechanisms of desire would be revived, enabling society to give aesthetic creativity, play, and maybe even sexual experimentation a newfound relevance.

Marcuse made a strong argument against Sartre's ideas on death, just like he did against Freud's apparent negative beliefs on human nature. Marcuse claims that "the brute fact of death denies once and for all the reality of a non-repressive existence." Prior to being compelled by society to exercise resignation systematically, he (the person) is resigned (Marcuse, 1966:231). This kind of surrender is appropriate, according to Marcuse, given Sartre's study of death.

Since the Other has the ability to reinterpret these things in a way that is quite different from how I initially perceived them, not only will I die, but my life, the decisions I make, and the accomplishments I have done are actually ineffective.

Thus, this antagonistic connection between myself, Others, and the environment not only exists while I am alive (as Sartre most powerfully argues with the analogy of the rocky crag), but also persists after my death. But how can my existence have significance while I am still living if my own death eliminates all value from life? Sartre is unable to respond to this query. And because he is unable to respond to it, Marcuse openly declares that his ethical stance—as well as all Existential ethical viewpoints that share the same Sartrean attitude with regard to freedom and death- is without worth (Marcuse, 1966:235).

Marcuse correctly points out that there is a fundamental flaw in Sartre's phenomenological portrayal of our "situation," which causes his idea of death to come to a dead end. Viewing the environment and the other in such blatantly hostile and conflictual terms is equivalent to replacing ontology with ideology. To "betray the promise of Utopia" is what is being done (Marcuse, 1966:236). This was never more evident in Sartre's thinking than in the interaction between the other and the dead.

The fact of death, according to Sartre, "gives the final victory to the point of view of the Other by transferring the combat and prize to another level- that is, by abruptly suppressing one of the combatants," (Sartre, 1956:544). Nevertheless, this negative viewpoint about our interactions with Others and how the Other perceives my passing is a plot by "the powers that be." Furthermore, Marcuse claims that "the powers that be" "Have a deep affinity to death; death as a token of un-freedom, of defeat."

According to Marcuse (1966:236), "theology and philosophy now fight with one another in celebrating death as an existential category, perverting biological truth into ontological essence, bestowing transcendental grace on the crime of mankind which they serve to perpetuate. The dynamic and evolving interactions that exist between people and their environment are what Marcuse wishes to stress instead. Because of this, we shouldn't view the en-soi as something that is antagonistic and impeding to our aims. Instead, we should acknowledge, as did Marx in 1845, that "the thing, reality... is a human sensuous activity, practice" (Marx 1982:143).

It follows that when we "confront" the outer world, we are actually facing ourselves since the sensual activity to which Marx alludes is always dialectical: there is a dynamical connection between the environment, others, and me. The connections we forge with objects, other people, and the connections we all have to society as a whole are mutual, dynamic, and most crucially, changeable. Only when we want them to be "instrumental" or "confrontational" are they actually such things. In order for us to collectively as a community and as a species reject to accept death as a natural limit, it is imperative that we emphasize and educate our fellow humans about this essential understanding of the human condition. Indeed, in certain cases, this may even entail rejecting the idea of death. The concept of death would then vanish, reduced to the status of a *flatus vocis*. Marcuse appears to be arguing that we must continue to defy the odds, even when we are dead. We have to declare, "I will not be the Other's prey."

In this way, the deceased are not "prey for the living" as Sartre thought; rather, they are fallen brothers and sisters who fought, battled, and gave their lives for the sake of human emancipation (Marcuse, 1966:238). We can only wage war against death and achieve humankind's greatest accomplishment- the defeat of death itself- by adopting this Marcusean stance, this unwillingness to accept death as a boundary.

An Examination of Jean Paul Sartre's Conception of Freedom and Death

Jean Paul Sartre created a framework that highlights both the human being's intrinsic freedom and the role that each individual performs in affecting both freedom and choice in order to emphasize choice and probability. Sartre has created a theory that centers on and facilitates the existence of man, given the position of man and the situation of man as understood by him. The work therefore has some value. Contrarily, this existentialism's primary inspiration appears to be founded on the profoundly religious experience of a man having come from nothing and heading toward nothing, and as a result, it has humanistic implications.

The paradoxes then become an issue. If man originates from nothing and without a purpose in this scenario, his genesis is nonsensical. He leads a life about which he understands nothing except history in an effort to destroy himself. As a result, Sartre's theory is rightly referred to as an atheistic theology since, although being in stark contrast to a theistic worldview, it nonetheless based its claims on God – or, at the very least, the nonexistence of God.

All of man's actions, in Sartre's view, are inspired and motivated by the desire to be and the effort to become God. Sartre even argues that removing God is necessary before understanding the philosophy of existence. He continues, "I represent atheistic existentialism, which is more coherent."

It contends that even in the absence of God, there remains at least one being—man, or, as Heidegger puts it, "human reality"—in whose existence essence precedes, a being who existing before he can be defined by any idea. What is meant by the statement that existence precedes essence? It indicates that before defining himself, man must first be, manifest, and appear. Man cannot be defined since he is nothing at first, according to existentialists.

Until he creates what it is he will be, he won't truly be anything. As a result, there is no human nature since there is no God to imagine it. Man is not only what he imagines himself to be, but also only what he wills himself to be after this surge into existence. (Sartre 1956: 19) Sartre's main goal is to make man confront the repercussions of his actions in a universe devoid of meaning since the basis of his behavior—namely, the existence of God and the progression of man toward God—is based on an imagined impossibility. Using the supposition that God doesn't exist and that human nature isn't set in stone, Sartre structured the man entirely on his own. Man's personality, perceptions, and choices are therefore wholly his own. Sartre's justification is as stated. Sartre, meanwhile, flees from God like a gazelle. For Sartre, some essential aspects of the entire human dilemma cause the delusion that God exists. In accordance with Sartre, having trust in God is really detrimental to one's health and is caused by a form of "bad faith" or an incapacity to embrace the truth of one's own freedom. When something is resisted and cannot be resisted, Sartre (1956:15) claims that this is the first indication of bad faith.

Bad faith is a response to a circumstance in which a person must overcome his or her sense of self in a world that was created by others but that, due to the necessity of their dependence, they must accept as their own. He must express his opinion on the world as he sees it. Realizing one is free causes pain and loneliness, and both realizations are followed by disease. Sartre is aware that by professing to be an atheist, he is leaving the certainty of experience and entering the realm of speculation and likelihood. He views metaphysics as an imaginative pursuit that cannot provide confidence and the existence or nonexistence of God as a philosophical topic.

His ontology, as opposed to metaphysics, is a description of facts, making it, in his view, subject to the criteria of truth or falsity. He seems to have a basic reluctance to make more assumptions than are unmistakably confirmed by experience. This theory fundamentally contradicts Sartre's claim that death is the one thing that limits a person's freedom because it is outside of human existential possibilities. This is due to the fact that death is a basic component of human existence. Death is a given, much like birth and a few other human facts that collectively make up the 'given' (facticity) in human life- things that an individual cannot change via the exercise of free will.

If Sartre sees it as a limitation on freedom, he should be prepared to add more limitations like birth, a person's environment, their family, etc. The fact that Sartre admits the existence of these other realities as ones imposed on man after death while rejecting the reality of any other restrictions on freedom speaks powerfully about the errors in his logic. It may be argued that Sartre only does this because he is prepared to put all of his efforts on defending the absolutism of freedom. He appears to be alarmed that his existentialist, which asserts that freedom is absolute and devoid of God, would be compromised if it were to include birth, the environment, DNA, etc. as agents of facticity that pose a threat to freedom in addition to death. As a result, it is hard to talk about birth and death without bringing up humanity. Man is the only other sentient being, and he is aware of both his own and other consciousness's.

Consequently, compared to other species, only man essentially completely comprehends the implications of what it means to die or give birth. So it is possible to say that death is a clear description of what it is to be human. Furthermore, Sartre believes that freedom—which he sees as the fundamental attribute of humanity- should not be constrained by death because death is a feature of man's existence in the universe.

Conclusion

In spite of the far-reaching implications of Sartre's postulation on freedom, his perspective serves as a reminder that considering the challenges facing our existence in this world, each individual person nevertheless has the ability to positively impact both his or her own life and the lives of others. No one, no matter how unfortunate, is born without the possibility for future improvement. We have the inherent power to guide our destiny and aims toward a magnificent finish if we are biologically able to grow and develop, of course while relying on divine assistance. The eternal, age-old debate between free choice and

determinism is another thing Sartre's ideas on freedom and death remind us of. Man is a combination of the forces of freedom and determinism, as demonstrated by Sartre's failure to properly explain how freedom and death relate to one another. One may argue that a person's degree of freedom influences their overall identity. Although we might use our free will, it's not a given. This is why man cannot solve every problem by himself.

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