

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Paul VI, *Apos. Exhort., Evangelica Testificatio*, Roma 1971, 1/1010, n. 11

¹⁰¹ Cf. Paul VI, *Motu Proprio, Ecclesiae Sanctae*, Rom 1966, II, 2/856-7, n. 14

¹⁰² c. 587: "The whole patrimony of an institute must be faithfully preserved by all. This patrimony is comprised of the intentions of the founders, of all that the competent ecclesiastical authority has approved concerning the nature, purpose, spirit and character of the institute, and of its sound tradition".

¹⁰³ G. Lobo, *New Canon Law for Religious*, op. cit., p. 27.

¹⁰⁴ *cf. T. Rincon, Institutes of Consecrated Life and Societies of Apostolic Life in Code of Canon Law Annotated*, Montreal 1993 pp. 409-492.

¹⁰⁵ Congregation for the Institutes of Life Consecrated and of the Bishops, directives, *Mutuae Relationes*, Roma 1978, n. 12.

¹⁰⁶ C. 611, #2

¹⁰⁷ C. 587, #1: "To protect more faithfully the vocation and identity of each institute, the fundamental code or constitutions of the institute are to contain, in addition to those elements which are to be preserved in accordance with c. 578, basic norms about the governance of the institute, the discipline of the members, the admission and formation of members, and the proper object of their sacred bond".

¹⁰⁸ C. 590, #1 & 2.

¹⁰⁹ For a more extensive reading on the limitedness of the authority of the Supreme Pontiff and the diocesan Bishop, cf. Jude A. Asanbe, *The Authority of the Diocesan Bishop and the Decisions of the Conference of Bishops in the light of recent studies*, an appraisal of c. 455, *ad L.*, Roma 1996, pp. 120-133

¹¹⁰ C. 591

¹¹¹ At the face value this question appears quite irrelevant. But then when I asked a few of my friends just casually, I discovered that it may not be a waste of time giving some time to attend to this issue.

¹¹² John Paul II, *Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Vita Consecrata*, Roma 1996 n. 48.

¹¹³ Synod of Bishops - Special Assembly for Africa, *Instrumentum Laboris, The Church in Africa and her Evangelizing Mission Towards the Year 2000, "You shall be my witness" (Acts 1:8)*, Vatican City 1993, n. 32, p. 29.

EDMUND HUSSERL'S RECOMPILATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS IN TRADITIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

BY KOLAWOLE A. OWOLABI

INTRODUCTION

Edmund Husserl is to twentieth century philosophy, what Plato, Descartes and Kant were to their times. Husserl, like these earlier philosophers, was determined to solve the problems of philosophy, particularly that of epistemology which he regarded as the core of philosophy. It is this ambition that generated not only his phenomenology but also his epistemic foundationalism. The problem that he seeks to resolve is the antagonism between various orientations in traditional philosophy. It was in this bid to reconcile the warring parties in philosophy, particularly epistemology that he went in search of a common ground for the opposing views. This common ground Husserl later referred to as phenomenology, which he calls the foundation of philosophy.

This mission to reconcile the conflicting views in traditional philosophy gave birth to Husserl's phenomenology. He saw his phenomenology as a renewal of the Kantian "Copernican revolution". He wanted, like Kant, to reconcile the warring parties in philosophy and to bring together in a common system, the multiple and divergent theories in philosophy so that they would all become unified as one. Husserl, like Kant, wanted to commence this reconciliatory exercise with epistemology, which he saw as the heart of philosophy.

The phenomenology of Husserl was therefore an attempt in the Cartesian and Kantian spirit to rebuild philosophy, to build a castle that will accommodate all the conflicting theories within it. It is an attempt at bringing under the same roof rationalism and empiricism. This was what led to his foundationalism. To attain this objective, Husserl would have to go the beginning and start from the index of zero. All existing philosophical theories will have to be suspended until further notice. Husserl aimed at this reconciliation in his book, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure phenomenology*, where he states:

In the fundamental position we have set up we have presupposed nothing, not even the concept of philosophy and we intend to hold on to this policy henceforth. The philosophic epoch, which we propose to adopt, should consist

*when explicitly formulated, in this that in respect of the theoretical, we shall abstain from passing any judgment at all and that our whole discussion shall respect the limits imposed by this abstention.*¹

The essence of this statement is to confirm that Husserl seeks to investigate the various positions in traditional philosophy and effect a reconciliation of their differences.

THE BEGINNING OF HIS PHENOMENOLOGY

In this same book, Husserl tried to show that both empiricism and rationalism are two extremes and sought to show their limitations as well as their assets. He argues that at the middle of this is phenomenology, which is the synthesis and hybrid of both empiricism and rationalism. Husserl in the book showed that phenomenology can synthesize both empiricism and rationalism and he also argues that this is not a contradiction to the phenomenological mind. He says that the root of both empiricism and rationalism lies in the "transcendental ego". He argued that phenomenology is empiricism in as much as empiricism seeks to go to the primary data of experience. According to him:

*Empiricist Naturalism springs, as we must recognize from the most praiseworthy motives. It is an intellectual practical radicalism, which in opposition to all idols to the powers of tradition and superstition to crude and refined prejudices of every kind, seeks to establish the right of the self-governing reason to be the only authority in matters that concern truth.*²

Husserl's position is simply that the empiricists should be commended for insisting that the datum of experience or the object of knowledge should be apprehended. This aspect of empiricism should be adopted and for this the phenomenological slogan, "to the things themselves" became popular and this

represents the empiricist aspect of Husserl's phenomenology.

Husserl also agrees with the empiricists when he said, "natural knowledge begins with experience and remains within experience."³ This Kantianism is consistently affirmed throughout Husserl's philosophical career. To him, the world is the totality of objects that can be known through experience; known in terms of orderly theoretical thought on the basis of direct presence.⁴ All the above positions clearly indicate that Husserl subscribed to empiricism. To him some of the cardinal principles of empiricism cannot be thrown away, because they are indeed epistemological assets. In this respect Husserl was drawn most to Hume and his radical empiricism became the appropriate starting point of his project. He saw Hume as the peak and ideal of empiricism although he disagrees with his skeptical conclusions. In this respect therefore:

*Husserl liked to present Hume as 'the first and greatest although descriptive phenomenologist.' And he claimed that Hume was deceived into thinking that he was some kind of empirical psychologist "introspecting" particular sense data and building up generations to account for ordinary mental phenomena... Husserl claims that on the contrary, Hume's object is to exhibit the essential in the particular. Husserl was led to call Hume the first phenomenologist in so far as Hume described what appears.*⁵

THE REBUILDING

But the fascination of Husserl for empiricism was at the early stage of his career when he was just coming to philosophy from mathematics. At later stage of his career, his heart was for rationalism tainted with the idealism of the German tradition. At this later stage he was simply a rationalist idealist. His phenomenology at the later stage departed from traditional empiricism because of what he considered as the inadequacy of empiricism and this departure from empiricism was well summarized by Albert Chanler in this manner.

Empiricism is a wholesale tendency in so far as it demands that all theory should

rest upon direct seeing of realities rather than upon tradition and prejudice. But it is arbitrary and dogmatic in its assumption that all seeing must be of the empirical type, namely, the perception of individual facts, localized in space and time. Logic and mathematics rest in fact upon quite a different kind of seeing.⁶

It is this inability of the empiricist to cognize the knowledge from mathematics and logic that made rationalism appeal to Husserl and made him to argue for rationalism, particularly in his later works. He wanted to show that rationalism if radicalized, could complement empiricism. In the light of this, Husserl saw phenomenology as a form of rationalism because it is preoccupied with the general essences of all things. Husserl's phenomenology seeks to apprehend the eidetic or essential knowledge rather than individual knowledge. It seeks to comprehend the Eidos and cognizes the eidetic rather than the empirical aspect of things. To him, for example, true knowledge is the knowledge of redness in all red objects and not the particular red color in an individual object. Husserl seeks to know the unchanging entities behind changing things, the essences or the eidos, and in this he became a rationalist.

Although Husserl believes as an empiricist that true knowledge begins with experience, he also contends that true knowledge should strive at universals, essences, rather than particulars. He believes that since experience is the best way of apprehending knowledge, it should aim at the eidos rather than the individuals. The knowledge of particulars is not true knowledge because they are not durable and can easily lose their certainty. The knowledge of individuals can only make meaning when the universal is cognized. According to him "Individual Being of every kind is, to speak generally, 'accidentally'". It is "so and so" but essentially it could be other than it is.⁷ Husserl believes that the true and pure knowledge is the knowledge of universals. Everything, that is, all particulars have "essential" being and they are with an eidos to be apprehended in all its purity.

An individual object is not simply and quite generally an individual, a 'this there' something unique, but being constituted thus and thus "in itself", it has its own proper mode of being, its own supply of essential predicables which must qualify it

(qua "Being as it is in itself") if other secondary relative determinations are to qualify it.⁸

All the above mere repetitions of the obvious fact in the eidetic studies, that is that particulars are mere reflections of universals; that the individual possesses the attributes of the eidos, and that form the particulars we can apprehend the flow of qualities from their essences. "Every material being", Husserl says, "has its own essential derivations and the limit, the universal derivative".⁹ At this stage Husserl has completely pitched his camp with rationalism for only rationalism can give him the knowledge of the universal.

In the light of the foregoing, it becomes clear why Husserl felt that his reconciliation would lead to a situation whereby phenomenology would become a combination of both empiricism and rationalism. But phenomenology needs to reconstruct the two theories, before it can be able to reconcile them. There was the need therefore for a reconstruction of traditional empiricism; to enable it grasp the universal essences or eidos, which are the objects of knowledge according to the new theory that Husserl sought to propound. Empiricism in the traditional form considers the universals as nothing but the summary of the attributes of the particulars, while rationalism feels that universals have their independent existence.

Husserl also disagrees with rationalism in some aspects and decided to reconstruct it. For rationalism assumes erroneously that we can know the essences without experience. Rationalism believes that facts could be separated from essences whereas Husserl believes otherwise. Hence Husserl sought to reconstruct rationalism in order to make it realize that both 'individuals' and 'essences' are related, only that essences are superior and prior to particulars. It was this attempt at reconstruction that led Husserl to the theory of "transcendental subjectivity". For it is only in the theory of transcendental subjectivity that the reconciliation and reconstructions that Husserl was trying to bring about could be realized. Let us see how Husserl carried out this reconstruction.

Husserl began his reconstruction of traditional epistemology with his contention that facts cannot be separated from essences that the individual is a derivative of the universal. In the light of this, he contended that an individual is derived from essence.¹⁰ Individual intuition, he asserted, passes into essential insight, which he calls ideation.¹¹ Husserl continued by claiming that individual intuition is similar to eidetic or essential intuition; but calls the former "empirical intuition" and the latter "eidetic insight" or "ideation".

By individual intuition Husserl meant the immediate knowledge of individual entities or particular objects. For example the fact that the particular tomato is red

intuition is consciousness of an individual object such as eidetic insight; it is the consciousness of an Eidos. The two intuitions are both directed, this means that they are both related to the world. With intentionality Husserl aims at showing that the two intuitions have the world as their correlate and in this, he seeks to show that the two are similar. Even essential insight, he feels has something to do with the world and he says:

It lies in the intrinsic nature of essential intuition that it should rest on what it is - a chief factor of individual intuition, namely, the striving for this visible presence of an individual fact, though it does not, to be sure, presuppose any apprehension of the individual or recognition of its reality. Consequently it is certain that no essential intuition is possible without the free possibility of directing one's glance to an individual counterpart and of shaping an illustration; just as contrariwise no free possibility of carrying out an act of ideation and therein directing one's glance upon the corresponding essence which exemplifies itself in something individually visible.¹⁴

Despite this similarity, Husserl felt that essential insight is still different from empirical intuition in principle. But Husserl argued that we couldn't think of eidetic insight without individual intuition. He went on to look at the differences between the two as one type of difference that exists between "existence" that is individual concrete being and essence, the type of difference between "facts" and eidos.¹⁵

Furthermore, Husserl asserted that though most essential insights need individual intuitions and cannot act independently of them, nevertheless, there are some essential insights that could be done without individual intuition.¹⁶ What is saying here is that there are some pure essential insights, which are not derived from individual objects such as fantasy and imagination? Husserl calls this type of essential insight "pure thought" or "unmixed thought", for it "does not imply any positing of individual existence whatsoever; pure essential truths do not make the slightest assertion concerning facts."¹⁷ Husserl is by this trying to imply that some essential insights are pure and independent of experience, they are "unmixed thought" and therefore independent of empirical facts. This stand is without doubt a mark of rationalism in the traditional sense, which Husserl wanted to avoid. By this, Husserl has pitched his camp with the rationalists and thereby defeats his reconciliatory objective.

*In the light of this new development,
Husserl makes a demarcation between*

is an individual intuition. Whereas by eidetic insight, he meant the universal apprehension of the fact that all tomatoes are red. Husserl is therefore saying that in essence, both the knowledge of particulars and that of universals are attained intuitively. In fact, he said, "of whatever kind the individual intuition may be, whether adequate or not, it can pass off into essential intuition and the latter, whether correspondingly adequate or not, has the character of a dator act".¹²

Summarizing the similarities in individual intuition and essential insight, Husserl said:

Essential insight is still intuition just as the eidetic object is still an object. The generalization of the correlative mutually attached concepts intuition and object is not a causal whim, but is compellingly demanded by the very nature of things. Empirical intuition, more specifically, sense experience is consciousness of an individual object and as an intuiting agency, "brings it to givenness" as perception to primordial givenness, to the consciousness of something of an 'object'; a something towards which its glance is directed, a something "self given" within it; but which can then be presented in other acts vaguely, or distinctly thought, made the subject of true and false predictions...¹³

THE ATTEMPT AT RECONCILIATION

Husserl, as we can see from the passage quoted above, seeks to show further how essential insight is a correlate of empirical insight since the latter is derived from the former. Both traditional empiricists and traditional rationalists would rather reject this position. These two categories of philosophers would reject Husserl's reconciliation exercise. Traditional empiricists would not listen to any talk of eidetic intuition, for the independent existence of the 'eidos' is according to them not possible. On the other hand traditional rationalists would reject an eidos, which is known empirically and intuitively since "essences" are a priori and independent of individuals.

In the above quoted passage the similarity between "empirical intuition" and "essential insight" lies in the fact that the two are "intentional" that is empirical

what he calls "empirical-eidetic insight" and "pure eidetic insight". By pure eidetic insight he meant those eidetic insights, which are independent of experience, whereas by empirical-eidetic insight, he meant those eidetic insights, which has empirical facts as their correlates. As a derivative from this analysis of the dichotomy of "empirical intuition" and "essential insight" which we examined earlier Husserl talked of the dichotomy of science of facts-which studies empirical intuition and science of essences - which studies essential insights.

By the sciences of facts, Husserl meant such natural sciences like biology or psychology and by sciences of essence he meant the eidetic studies like pure logic or mathematics. Husserl argued that sciences of essence are independent of sciences of facts whereas sciences of facts are not independent of sciences of essences. Sciences of essences, Husserl said "... in all their thought constructions, are free through out from any positing of actual; or what comes to the same thing, in them no experience, i.e. qua consciousness that apprehends or sets up reality or concrete being can take over the function of supplying a logical ground".¹⁸

Husserl went on to argue that a geometer who is a student of the sciences of essence does not need experience to comprehend his study. He does not have experience as the foundation of his study. He can decide to draw his figures in experience or fantasy. The choice is left to him. Whereas according to Husserl:

The student of nature behaves quite differently. He observes and experiments, i.e. he fixes what is concretely there just as he experiences it: experience for him is an act that supplies grounds, and for which mere imagination could never be a substitute. For this very reason, science of fact and science of experience (Erfahrung) are equivalent concepts. But for the geometer, who studies not actual but essential relationships, essential insight and not

experience is the act that supplies the ultimate ground.¹⁹

Husserl further asserted that though sciences of facts rely on sciences of essence and cannot work without them, the reverse happens to sciences of essence because according to him "eidetic sciences exclude in principle every assimilation of theoretical results of empirical science... From facts follow always nothing but facts".²⁰

What Husserl seems to be saying in other words is that natural science cannot do without eidetic science since it must in the process of analysis and judgment of its data, observe the law of formal logic. He says again that natural science if it seeks to study objects must conform to the universal rule of mathematics. In essence what he is saying is that if natural science seeks to understand the external objects it cannot at any level do it independently of eidetic sciences.²¹

The analysis of the dichotomy of individual intuition, fact and essence, sciences of facts and sciences of essence is not a digression, rather Husserl wanted by this analysis to show that individual intuition is complementary to the universal essence. By this he seeks to show indirectly that empiricism and rationalism if they are reconstructed, are complementaries, which is what his pure phenomenology is out to do. He confirmed this in this language: "The general discussion concerning essence and science of essences in contrast with fact and the science of facts which we have undertaken by way of prelude concerning essential foundations for our construction of idea of pure phenomenology."²²

What we can see from the above analysis is that Husserl's pure phenomenology cannot reconcile traditional empiricism and traditional rationalism. Husserl has without doubt been very partial towards rationalism. From what we have seen, he is not true to the spirit of reconciliation. He brought into phenomenology, through the back door, traditional rationalism, or how else should one describe all his assertions about the superiority and priority of essences over facts, which permeated the whole of Husserl's analysis?

Be that as it is, let us continue with our examination of Husserl's reconstruction of traditional epistemology. Husserl says that his quarrel with empiricism is that it denies concepts like "ideas", "Essence and knowledge of existential being". Husserl felt that empiricism cannot deny all those without destroying its own foundation, according to him the victorious advance of the natural sciences, can be credited to mathematics which is an eidetic enterprise; it can therefore not turn round to destroy this same foundation. There is no doubt that eidetic grounding has favored philosophical empiricism and has made it the dominating, and indeed in the circle of empirical science, the almost exclusively

dominating conviction. Empiricism, Husserl felt, should be debunked for biting the finger that fed it. The denial of "essence of eidetic 'sciences'" is detrimental to empiricism.

Husserl continues that although empiricism has good intentions, is seeking to make immediate experience, the only judge or the only source of knowledge, it however spoils everything by thinking that experience is only the experience of matters or fact and thereby rejects essences as opposed to facts. To them "what is imagination is simply imaginary science".² Husserl asserts that empiricism, as a philosophical theory will regard any talk of "ideas" or "essences" as "ideological extravagance", a "reversion to scholasticism" or a sort of "speculative construction a priori".³

The rejection of 'essences' by the empiricists, Husserl argued is borne out of misconception. He says:

.... all that the empiricists here say rests on misunderstanding and prejudices - however good or well meant the motive that inspired him. The fundamental defect of empiricism's argument lies in this, that the basic argument of the return to the "facts themselves" is identified or confused with the requirement that all knowledge shall be grounded in experience. Accepting the intelligible naturalistic limitation of fields of knowable "facts", he takes for granted without further question that experience is the only act through which facts *sachen* are not necessarily the fact world [*Wirklichkeit*] in general, and it is only with the fact world of nature that the primordial *dator* act which we call experience is concerned.⁴

Husserl continued his argument against empiricism by asserting that empiricism has defeated its purpose, that is its' desire to have a prejudice-free return to things themselves by rejecting non-experimental facts or judgments. He continued that facts or judgment may be experimental or not; we should therefore not reject non-experimental facts. "Immediate seeing" (*sachen*), not merely the sensory seeing of experience but seeing in general as primordial *dator*, consciousness of any kindness whatsoever is the ultimate source of justification for all rational statements,⁵ he argues further.

By this Husserl wanted to correct the erroneous notion of the empiricists that sense experience is synonymous with the return to facts themselves. He, in the light of this misconception replaced the word "experience" with "intuition" which he felt is more appropriate and will capture both sensory seeing and the eidetic seeing which "experience will deny".⁶

Empiricism by its skepticism of eidetic science will involve itself in absurdity. The denial of essences is borne out of misconception; it is borne out of an unclarified assumption, that is the assumption that sense experience is the only form of experience. For this reason, Husserl feels the need for a new empiricism that would avoid the limitation of the traditional empiricism. He said this of his new empiricism:

Whereas, this philosopher holding characteristically to an adopted stand point and in open contradiction with their principle of freedom from bias, starts out from unclarified, ungrounded preconceptions, from the totality of the intuitively self-given which is prior to any theorizing reflection, from all that one can immediately see and lay hold of provided does not allow oneself to be blinded by prejudice and so tend to ignore whole classes of genuine data.⁷

Husserl's new empiricism or phenomenological empiricism involved a true prejudice-free philosophizing. Husserl feels that this new theory would really become *dejure* and *defacto* independent of preconceptions and thereby apprehend the self-given intuitively. The intuitively self-given is not only the sensory experiencing but also the eidetic experiencing. At this level, phenomenology becomes empiricism; it replaces the ill-conceived empiricism of traditional epistemology. Phenomenology, Husserl affirms, is positivism, but it is a radical one. He expatiates further:

If by positivism we are to mean the absolute unbiased grounding of all sciences on what can be primordially apprehended, then it is we who are the genuine positivists. In fact we permit no authority to deprive us of the right of recognizing all kinds of intuitions as equally valuable sources for justification of knowledge, not even that of "modern natural science".

When it is really natural science that speaks, we listen willingly and as disciples. But the language of the natural scientists is not always that of natural science itself and is assuredly not so when they speak of "natural philosophy" and the "theory of knowledge of natural science" ... but just on this account it is clear to us that the "positivists" confuse at one time the cardinal distinction between the types are yet not willing, being bound by their prejudices to recognize more than one of these as valid or indeed even present at all.⁸

After his criticism of traditional empiricism, he went on to deal with traditional rationalism. But his attack on rationalism is relatively mild. Husserl criticizes rationalism for failing to show that pure intuition is possible. Rationalism he said "does not bring to clear consciousness through reflection the fact that there is such thing as pure intuition, a mode of being presented in which essences are primordially given in empirical intuition."⁹ Husserl thus wishes to show that rationalism in its traditional form needs amendments and needs to be told that it should not be apathetic of 'pure intuition' but to champion its existence loud and clear to convince the skeptics and the empiricists.

Rationalism, he argues takes a lot for granted and remains apathetic. Even its quest for self-evidence is quite an illusion. The quest is totally misconceived. The true meaning of self-evidence is completely lost to rationalism. Their feeling for self-evidence is theoretically invented feelings.¹⁰ Husserl is here saying that rationalism has totally misunderstood the meaning of self-evidence. The rationalists conceive it as the basis of all judgments instead of modestly calling it that that provides insights into essential relation. Self-evidence, Husserl asserts, is mere insight.

The objectives of this reconciliation by Husserl are to establish that knowledge of both facts and essences can be possible. Any denial of this is based on assumption. Empiricists can no more deny essences and ideas. Blindness to ideas, he says is a form of psychic blindness. We in can in our theories chatter about and deny ideas and essences, but they remain in existence no matter our persistency in denying them.¹¹

In the final analysis, the synthesis of both empiricism and rationalism is intuition. This is because only intuition combines both the sense experience of empiricism with the introspection of rationalism. Knowledge, he says, is the intuitive cognition whether through individual intuition, that is, perception of the individual

object or through eidetic intuition, which is the knowledge of the universal essences. Intuition, therefore, to Husserl, is the universal principle of principles.¹² In this respect, Husserl maintains that knowledge, whether of the eidetic or the particulars, come from the primordial dator. Genuine knowledge therefore is the knowledge that revealed itself through intuition in its original form.

SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK

The question that we should ask now is this, how does this epistemological reconciliation lead Husserl to the transcendental subject, which in his later philosophy, become the nerve center of his epistemology. The answer is obvious. If we say we should apprehend the object of knowledge in its primordial and original form and that this is the best mode of acquiring, then we are faced with another problem: Can we as the subject of knowledge adhere to this injunction? Can we obey, to the letter, the command of the principle of intuition and apprehend objects as they are primordially given? The answer is definitely in the negative. Human beings, Husserl feels, always bring in their prejudices, presumptions and unclarified views into whatever they do. This prejudice will definitely distort the object of knowledge and thereby defeat the purpose of phenomenological intuition.

It is in order to avoid this problem that Husserl argues for a purification of the subject. The subject needs to be fully purged of all his assumptions and prejudices, before it can be capable of knowing objects in their original form. The purification will definitely change the ego from a natural one to what Husserl calls the pure or transcendental ego. This pure ego will be detached, objective and prejudice-free. It will therefore be capable of apprehending the true nature of all things primordially in their original state.

As we can see now, Husserl's foundation of knowledge has changed from the immediate dator of knowledge to the transcendental subject. Why is this sudden turn-around? The reason according to one of his disciples, Roman Ingarden, is that Husserl tries to react to a tenable criticism by one of his contemporaries that justifying knowledge on the basis of the same object of knowledge is begging the question.¹³ Husserl accepts this observation and moves to find a more tenable foundation of knowledge, which he finds in the subject of knowledge. This transcendental subject is the synthesis of empiricism and rationalism. It is empiricist in as much as it is the ego that takes part in the process of experience that leads to knowledge. It is also rationalistic because it is the subject that carries out the internal introspection and internal reasoning. Husserl's transcendental subject is therefore the climax of the reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism.

CONCLUSION

In concluding this paper, we can say that Husserl like his predecessors, Descartes and Kant, failed to reconcile both empiricism and rationalism. Very much like Kant, his support of rationalism as against empiricism, can be noticed throughout his discussion. The reason why traditional philosophers failed consistently to effect a mediation of opposing positions is simply because philosophy by its very nature can sustain unanimity. The most important reason for the failure in this respect is that philosophers who promise to effect such reconciliations are always not faithful to their promise. When the claim is made about the desire to synthesize or mediate, it is always a ploy to make a viewpoint that a philosopher accepts to more acceptable, and more often, the contrary position is further exposed and made repugnant. In actual fact, philosophers, by their training and orientation cannot sustain eclecticism. There is always a tendency for philosophers to make their viewpoint acceptable rather than get a mid-point. This is the reason for the failure of the previous to mediate in philosophical conflicts. It is also the reason for the failure of Edmund Husserl to reconcile the conflicting theories in traditional philosophy.

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- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 62.
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- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 80.
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SCHOPENHAUER AND PESSIMISM

BY EMMANUEL OGUNDELE

INTRODUCTION

Arthur Schopenhauer has been known and called a philosopher of pessimism. Yet a closer look at his pessimism would reveal that it was a position very much in agreement with how he saw life. His pessimism is not just pessimism for its own sake but one which is rooted in human nature itself, as he perceived it, because of the activity of the will or will-to-live. Man's life, in his view, is rooted and neck-deep in so much suffering that there is no respite for him through all the available means of seeking consolation save in the turning the will against itself in self-renunciation. The will is central to Schopenhauer's entire philosophy. This is why he has been called a 'metaphysical voluntaristic idealist' or a 'philosopher of the will'. My aim in this paper is to drive home the position that Schopenhauer is indeed a philosopher of pessimism and that there is every consistency with his entire philosophy. Before one can begin to argue for this position, it is important to espouse the nature of the will according to Schopenhauer.

THE NATURE OF THE WILL IN SCHOPENHAUER'S

The primacy of the will to Schopenhauer's entire philosophy is without question. The common understanding of the will is that it is a conscious and deliberate choice to behave in a certain way. According to Stumpf, "We consider the will an agent of our intellect, that is an attribute or faculty possessed by a rational person."¹ Schopenhauer was against this kind of idea especially as championed by Descartes for whom 'thought' is the essence of man. This manner of philosophising is absurd for Schopenhauer. Man has a body and he is primarily a doer and only secondarily a knower and so the nature of his consciousness is dependent on 'will was therefore taken over by Schopenhauer and used in a slightly different way. The will for him is a blind irrational force. This will, according to him, manifests itself as the "will to live" which is the cause of all the sufferings and evil in the will. The will is the "thing-in-itself, the spiritual source of Nature, the primordial subject which objectifies itself in space, time and causality. Far beyond the *noumenon* of Kant which could not be known, Schopenhauer claims that the will is indeed the "thing-in-itself" thus objectifying itself in different things. He declares at the very beginning of the *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, "The World is my representation," and again:

The will as thing-in-itself is quite different from the phenomenon, and is entirely free of all the forms of the phenomenon into which it passes when it appears, and which therefore concern only its objective...²

In essence, for Schopenhauer, to exist as a human being is to will since the will entails constant desire, want, striving and wishing. The world, for Schopenhauer, is ultimately the metaphysical will since it is manifested in space and time as a single, blind, insatiable, striving force, which imprints its nature in each and everything. This will-to-live is omnipresent and is objectified in the body in various parts and forms. He explains:

Existence itself, and the kind of existence, in the totality as well as in every part is only from the will.... The will appears in everything, precisely as it determines itself in itself and outside time. The world is only the mirror of the willing; and all finiteness, all suffering, all misery that it contains, belongs to the expression of what the will wills.³

The will is therefore the only meta-phenomenal reality or thing-in-itself even though it appears in various ways in different things. Nonetheless, Schopenhauer says it is still the same one will. But how did Schopenhauer arrive at the idea that thing-in-itself is will? According to him, the key to this reality is found by looking within oneself. This inward-directed look will reveal the single narrow door to the truth, which is the will, or will-to-live since the bodily action that is occasioned as a result of my volition and the volition itself are one and the same. Thus, the will is the directly evident thing that is seen; meaning that the will is in everything and that the whole body is nothing but objectified will. In other words, the fundamental intuition that is common to all is that we are willing beings and the body is will as a presentation to consciousness. Once and since this is known, one can then extend this discovery to the world at large. The will is not only manifest in the body alone, it is also present in many other forms such as the impulse by which magnet turns to the north pole, in the phenomenon of attraction and repulsion, in animal instinct, human desire and so on. The omnipresence of the will means that everything is determined to large extent by it and nothing can escape its influence. For just as the will is described as an endless striving, a blind urge which knows no cessation, this same will or will-to-