Tolle Lege: An Augustinian Journal of Philosophy and Theology

Western epistemology has traditionally been rooted in logocentrism, a framework that emphasizes speech, presence, and stable meaning as the foundations of knowledge. From Plato’s idealism to Husserl’s phenomenology, this tradition assumes that truth can be accessed through immediate consciousness or rational discourse. Jacques Derrida’s philosophy challenges these epistemic foundations, arguing that logocentrism conceals inherent instabilities and hierarchical biases within its structures of meaning. Derrida’s critique destabilizes the epistemic certainty upon which much of Western thought depends. This leads to an essential dilemma: if meaning is perpetually deferred (différance) and there is no fixed, ultimate truth, on what grounds can we validate knowledge claims? Does Derrida’s position lead to epistemic relativism, or does it open new avenues for understanding truth and interpretation? Derrida's critique of logocentrism fosters a framework that intentionally resists conceptual closure in philosophical thought. This openness birthed different ways of thinking from different directions, not necessarily from the logocentric tradition. The research employs both analytic and hermeneutic methods. The exposition of logocentrism by Derrida relies on indefensible binaries, undermining claims to immediate, transparent knowledge. The endless deferral of meaning complicates traditional epistemic justification, displacing the subject as the center of knowledge. While Derrida's project critiques epistemic absolutism, it struggles to provide an alternative framework for validating knowledge claims that does not depend on logocentric norms. This study argues that Derrida's unfinished project intentionally resists completion, preserving a fluid and adaptable critique that continuously engages with new forms of epistemic domination while remaining open-ended. 

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