Nnadiebube Journal of Philosophy

The contemporary separation of mental and physical health reflects, in part, a deeper philosophical fragmentation of the human person. Against this reductionist tendency, this paper examines Aristotle’s hylomorphic conception of the human being as an integrated unity of soul (psyche) and body (sōma). For Aristotle, the soul is not an independent substance temporarily inhabiting the body but the form, actuality, and organizing principle of a living body. This understanding challenge simplistic mind–body dualism and provides a philosophical basis for conceiving human well-being as multidimensional and intrinsically integrated. The paper argues that mental, physical, emotional, and ethical dimensions of human flourishing cannot be adequately understood in isolation because they belong to the functioning of one embodied person. Drawing particularly from Aristotle’s De Anima, Nicomachean Ethics, and related works, the study explores the implications of hylomorphism for contemporary conceptions of wellness. It contends that genuine well-being involves more than the absence of disease or psychological distress; it requires the harmonious actualisation of human capacities through rational activity, virtuous character, embodied participation, meaningful relationships, and purposeful living. Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia therefore offers a valuable philosophical complement to contemporary holistic approaches to health. The paper concludes that recovering the integrated self can help overcome artificial divisions between body and mind and provide a richer philosophical anthropology for understanding human flourishing. Aristotle’s hylomorphism thus remains relevant not merely as a historical metaphysical doctrine but as a framework for rethinking the unity, dignity, and well-being of the human person.

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