NJIKO: A Multi-Disciplinary Journal of Humanities, Law, Education and Social Sciences

Debates on the legitimacy of global governance institutions (GGIs) have largely been framed within Western political and legal traditions, emphasizing legality, procedural rationality, and state-centric representation. Despite significant theoretical contributions from thinkers such as Max Weber, Jurgen Habermas, John Rawls, and David Beetham, global institutions continue to face persistent legitimacy deficits, particularly among nations in the Global South. This paper argues that these deficits are not merely institutional or procedural but fundamentally normative and epistemic. Drawing on African philosophical traditions (especially communitarianism, Ubuntu ethics, and Innocent Asouzu's complementary reflection), the paper advances a relational conception of legitimacy grounded in moral inclusion, dialogical recognition, and shared humanity. It finds out that GGIs fail to attain genuine legitimacy insofar as they marginalize African and other Global South voices, universalize Western rationalities, and privilege state or technocratic representation over communal participation. Through a mediation of the tension between universalism and pluralism using African philosophical resources, the paper proposes a reconceptualization of global legitimacy that moves beyond legal consent and procedural deliberation toward relational justice and epistemic reciprocity. This African philosophical reframing offers both a critic of existing global governance structures and a normative foundation for more inclusive and morally credible global institutions.

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