NASARA JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

This study examines Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of certainty and its implications for epistemology. The problem of the certainty of knowledge is perennial in epistemology. Derrida attempted to solve the age-old problem by positingthat language plays an essential role in knowledge and that the problem of certainty is that of meaning; we can only know meaning,and meaning has no source to provide us with certainty. Derrida's submission is seen as nihilistic by some thinkers, as the simplistic crises of meaning cannot be said to be an epistemic problem of certainty. Therefore, Derrida's position is not suitable in philosophy. This study intends to show that Derrida's conception of the certainty of knowledge, especially his concept of deconstruction, influenced his philosophy. The study discovers that whatever we see in reality is a text/writing; there is always something hiding behind that which is present. This study argues that Derrida's deconstruction of certainty necessitates a reevaluation of epistemological assumptions, questioning the possibility of objective knowledge and underscoring the importance of contextual, interpretive, and provisional understandings. The study concludes that Derrida's philosophy is not a nihilistic dismantling and destruction of structures; instead, it is writing and the crossing of that writing, so that the old meaning is superimposed by new meaning without necessarily wiping out the old meaning; Derrida's enterprise discourages any doctrinal or dogmatic assertion. Hence, never arriving at certainty!

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