NASARA JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

This paper, titled “A Law That Does Not Consider Generality is Not a Law: Lon Fuller's Desiderata Reevaluated” critically examines the significance of generality within Lon Fuller's framework of the inner morality of law. Fuller posits that for a system of rules to qualify as law, it must satisfy eight moral criteria, known as the desiderata, including generality, publicity, clarity, non-contradiction, constancy, possibility of compliance, congruence between official action and declared rules, and prospectivity. Among these, this paper argues that generality is foundational, as it demands that laws apply equally to all persons in similar situations, thereby preventing arbitrariness and promoting fairness. This paper defends the thesis that a law lacking generality ceases to fulfill the essential characteristics of legality and becomes a tool of oppression or privilege. Adopting a critical-analytical methodology, the study interrogates Fuller's concept through philosophical reasoning and legal analysis, and assesses both historical and contemporary instances where laws have deviated from the principle of generality. The findings reveal that when laws are tailored to specific individuals or groups without justifiable legal grounds, they undermine the legitimacy and moral authority of the legal system. This paper concludes that generality is not just one among equals in Fuller's desiderata but is central to the very definition of law. It recommends that lawmakers and legal institutions consistently uphold the principle of generality to ensure justice, prevent discrimination, and preserve the integrity of the legal order.

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