‘REASON AS A SLAVE OF PASSION’ IN DAVID HUME’S MORAL THEORY: A GENUINE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY OR AN ABERRATION IN OUR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY?
A foundation of moral principles in tandem with ontological basis of human nature for human beings to live a good life and in harmony with others has been the concern of moral philosophers from Pre-Socratic days until now. It is indisputable that a universal and irrefutable moral principles for this purpose have being difficult to establish in human society. It is evident that many moral theories have been propounded, criticized, deconstructed and reconstructed by moral philosophers at different intervals in the history of humanity but none has offer incontrovertible moral theory. However, Hume?s moral theory was prominent in the Europe of eighteenth century as an alternative to the rationalist moral philosophy of Platonic tradition that dominated previous centuries. This paper locates Hume?s moral foundation in human passions motivated by sympathy for others irrespective of their relations and affiliations as the basis of moral preference, judgment and action of human beings. The research reveals why Hume attributes insignificant role to reason in moral commendation and condemnation. Nevertheless, a thorough appraisal of his moral theory shows that the moral aberrations attributable to his moral foundation makes his theory unrealistic and fertile ground for all kinds of moral discrepancies in human society.
Keywords: aberration, contemporary, david, foundation, genuine, hume’s, moral, morality, passion’, slave, society, theory, ‘reason