EKPOMA REVIEW

The epistemology of testimony is an inquiry into the nature of testimony as an epistemic source. Given that testimony is an epistemic source, is it a basic or generative epistemic source? Or does it derive its epistemic credentials from other more basic and generative epistemic sources, like; perception, reason, and introspection? If testimonial knowledge is dependent on other basic epistemic sources, it means that testimonial knowledge is inferential. On the alternative, if testimonial knowledge is basic, it implies an inherent justi?catory power. Given that there are two cognitive agents in testimonial epistemic transaction – the testi?er (speaker) and the receiver (hearer); where do we situate the justi?catory power of testimonial knowledge, the testi?er or the hearer? The responses to these questions have generated theories that dominantly swing between reductionism and anti-reductionism, bringing in the inferentialist and non-inferentialist perspectives. These theories, however, fail to successfully establish whether testimonial knowledge is basic or not and therefore, makes it problematic to establish the justi?catory source of testimonial knowledge. The less dominant quasireductionism of Duncan Pritchard opens up the possibility to consider Miranda Fricker's application of epistemic virtues to testimonial justi?cation. Therefore, with the aim to establish the justi?catory source of testimonial knowledge, this paper critically analyses and evaluates the role of epistemic virtues in testimonial knowledge. We argue that testimonial justi?cation is a two-way process, and conclude that testimonial belief is justi?ed as knowledge on the basis of the intellectual virtues of the testi?er's cognitive character traits and the hearer's cognitive faculties and excellences.

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