EKPOMA REVIEW

This paper argues for an epistemology of otherness; an epistemology which pursues knowledge not just from the knower’s perspective, but also from the known or object of knowledge or in a particular way, from the other person’s view which is referred to in this paper as the other. It develops this thesis from the ethical Alterity of Emmanuel Levinas, which privileges the other over the self. This mirrors the postmodernist efforts which react against the linear and the objectivist outlook of traditional and classical philosophy. The outlook of traditional philosophy was largely individualistic. The implication of this according to Levinas is a philosophy shrouded in egoism and for epistemology, our grounds for knowledge claims could be partial or incomplete. An epistemology of otherness, therefore, argues for an intersubjectivist epistemology as an option that can produce a wholesome epistemic situation. It argues that deference to the other both as a source of knowledge and justification of our beliefs would produce more warranted grounds for knowledge. This paper concludes that this option would help diminish all forms of epistemic injustices and imbalances to our knowledge claims. This essay adopts an expository-analytical method in both shedding light on the ethics of intersubjectivity of Emmanuel Levinas and against this backdrop, advance an epistemology of otherness which this paper argues and concludes can lead to knowing the other better and consequently, having a more inclusive epistemic situation.

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