APQ - APPON PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

This paper examines whether the introduction and proliferation of Virtual Reality (VR) technologies offer pragmatic support for George Berkeley's idealist philosophy, which posits that existence is contingent upon perception (esse est percipi). By looking at the ontological implications of immersive digital environments where users experience authentic scenarios and objects solely through sensory engagement, the paper adopts analytic method of research to question whether VR reinforces the idea that perception is foundational to the construction of reality. The paper contrasts Berkeley's metaphysical claims with the technological mechanisms underlying VR, particularly its reliance on simulated stimuli to create convincing "realities." In the end, the paper argues that while VR demonstrates how perception can shape and even dominate human experience, it does not conclusively validate Berkeley's metaphysical idealism, but rather invites us into rethinking of the boundaries between subjective experience and objective existence.

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