Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach represents a major philosophical shift in development theory by redefining development not as mere economic growth, but as the expansion of substantive human freedoms. In Development as Freedom, Sen challenges utilitarian and resource-based accounts of well-being, arguing that neither income levels nor preference satisfaction adequately capture what individuals are genuinely able to be and to do. This article offers a philosophical examination of Sen’s framework, focusing on its normative foundations, key conceptual distinctions, and implications for justice and human dignity. The paper first situates the Capability Approach within its broader intellectual context, highlighting its dialogue with Aristotelian notions of human flourishing, Kantian autonomy, and Adam Smith’s moral philosophy. It then analyzes Sen’s central concepts of functionings, capabilities, and agency, emphasizing freedom as both the primary end and the principal means of development. Particular attention is given to Sen’s account of instrumental freedoms political, economic, social, and protective as conditions for enhancing human agency. The article further explores the Capability Approach as an evaluative framework for assessing social arrangements, comparing it with utilitarianism and Rawls’s theory of justice. While acknowledging its strengths especially its respect for plural values, human dignity, and democratic public reasoning the paper also critically examines key philosophical challenges, including the problem of capability selection and measurement. The article concludes by arguing that Sen’s open-ended and freedom-centered conception of development provides a robust normative basis for contemporary debates on justice, human rights, and development policy, particularly in contexts marked by deep social and economic inequalities.
Keywords: Capability Approach; Development as Freedom; Human Dignity; Justice; Human Agency