AKWA IBOM STATE UNIVERSITY JOUNAL OF ARTS

This paper analysis Kant’s retributive theory of punishment as a betrayal of Afro-communalist conception of personhood. Kant’s theory maintains that punishment is justified solely because the offender deserves it, independent of social consequences. Within this framework, Justice demands proportional punishment as an end in itself, irrespective of communal welfare or relational considerations since the individual is construed as a fully autonomous, rational agent whose moral responsibility is self-contained. Afro-communalism, on the other hand (as articulated by thinkers such as John Mbiti and Ifẹ́anyi Menkiti,) emphasizes a relational idea of Personhood, constituted through participation in a moral community sustained by networks of social obligations. Therefore, punishment and wrongdoing are not merely a violation of abstract moral law but a disruption of communal harmony that affects both the offender and the broader social fabric. Adopting the philosophical methods of criticality, exposition and analysis, this paper argues that Kant’s retributive model, when analysed within Afro-communal context, undermines this important value within which African existence is made meaningful. The paper therefore concludes that Kantian retributivism is not merely a betrayal of Afro-communalistic personhood, but represents a philosophical imposition that distorts African interpretation of reality. In its place the paper calls for a more adequate theory of punishment that moves beyond retribution to embrace the values of restoration, reconciliation, and communal harmony that define African moral philosophy.

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